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Message-ID: <5127035E.5000205@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2013 22:34:22 -0700
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Vincent Danen <vdanen@...hat.com>, "Christey, Steven M." <coley@...re.org>
Subject: Re: CVE request: python-pyrad insecurities
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On 02/21/2013 04:12 PM, Vincent Danen wrote:
> * [2013-02-15 23:36:21 -0700] Kurt Seifried wrote:
>
>> -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1
>>
>> On 02/15/2013 04:53 PM, Vincent Danen wrote:
>>> * [2013-02-15 19:51:07 +0000] Christey, Steven M. wrote:
>>>
>>>> These two issues were fixed in the same diff and reflect
>>>> poor randomness - should we have only assigned one CVE? (If
>>>> the RADIUS feature was introduced in different versions than
>>>> the authenticator-password feature, then maybe the SPLIT is
>>>> acceptable.)
>>>
>>> I'm not sure. I didn't go digging to see when they were
>>> introduced -- both features may have been introduced at the
>>> same time (or not).
>>>
>>> Ok, so doing a quick peek at the first full blob of it in git:
>>>
>>> https://github.com/wichert/pyrad/blob/c206b1dfc362db8b0ef9c256814377bde8ed91cf/pyrad/packet.py
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
The use of random.randrange() is in both the CreateAuthenticator()
>>> and CreateID() functions, so I would bet that they've been
>>> like that the whole time (that blob is from Sept 2007). So I
>>> guess one CVE is probably sufficient.
>>>
>>> I only noted them as two issues as we had two separate bug
>>> reports about them.
>>>
>>>> -----Original Message----- From: Kurt Seifried
>>>> [mailto:kseifried@...hat.com] Sent: Friday, February 15,
>>>> 2013 2:37 PM To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Cc: Vincent
>>>> Danen Subject: Re: [oss-security] CVE request: python-pyrad
>>>> insecurities
>>>>
>>> On 02/15/2013 09:14 AM, Vincent Danen wrote:
>>>>>> Could a CVE be assigned to the following two issues
>>>>>> please?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> #1: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=911682
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Nathaniel McCallum of Red Hat reported that pyrad was
>>>>>> using Python's random module in a number of places to
>>>>>> generate pseudo-random data. In the case of the
>>>>>> authenticator data, it was being used to secure a
>>>>>> password sent over the wire. Because Python's random
>>>>>> module is not really suited for this purpose (not random
>>>>>> enough), it could lead to password hashing that may be
>>>>>> predictable.
>>>
>>> Please use CVE-2013-0294 for this issue.
>>>
>>>
>>>>>> #2: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=911685
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Nathaniel McCallum of Red Hat reported that pyrad was
>>>>>> creating serialized RADIUS packet IDs in the CreateID()
>>>>>> function in packet.py. This is not suitable for RADIUS as
>>>>>> the RFC specifies that the ID must not be predictable.
>>>>>> As a result, the ID of the next packet sent can be
>>>>>> spoofed.
>>>
>>> Please use CVE-2013-0295 for this issue.
>>
>> Please REJECT CVE-2013-0295 and use CVE-2013-0294 for both
>> issues (same code issue, same version, same reporter).
>
> Ok, so the reporter indicated that the patch noted does not fix
> both issues. It fixed one issue and the other CreateID() function
> referenced wasn't actually the CreateID() function he meant:
>
> https://github.com/wichert/pyrad/blob/38f74b36814ca5b1a27d9898141126af4953bee5/pyrad/packet.py#L518
>
>
>
> Different function and you can see that:
>
> CurrentID = (CurrentID + 1) % 256 return CurrentID
>
> isn't that great.
>
> Now that CVE-2012-0295 has been rejected, I suppose we cannot
> re-use it for this, but I think we need another CVE for the "real"
> CreateID() sequential RADIUS packet ID issue.
>
> Sorry about this. I hadn't realized there was more than one
> CreateID() function in there and the original report was short on
> details.
Please use CVE-2013-0342 for pyrad CreateID() packet ID issue. We
cannot reuse CVE's that have been rejected, it will anger the CVE gods
(well, mostly Steve, and all the vendors using this stuff =).
- --
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
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