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Message-ID: <51096780.5070204@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 30 Jan 2013 11:33:36 -0700
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Jan Lieskovsky <jlieskov@...hat.com>,
        "Steven M. Christey" <coley@...us.mitre.org>,
        Jeff Law <law@...hat.com>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
        Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: CVE Request -- glibc: DoS due to a buffer overrun
 in regexp matcher by processing multibyte characters

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

On 01/30/2013 04:40 AM, Jan Lieskovsky wrote:
> Hello Kurt, Steve, vendors,
> 
> a security flaw was found in the regular expression matching 
> routine of glibc, the GNU libc libraries, processed multibyte 
> characters input. If an application utilized the glibc's regular 
> expression matching mechanism, an attacker could provide a
> specially-crafted input that, when processed would lead to that
> executable crash.
> 
> Upstream bug report: [1]
> http://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=15078
> 
> Relevant patch: [2]
> http://sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2013-01/msg00967.html
> 
> More background: * (from Paolo): Jan 30 11:34:19 <bonzini> iankko:
> it is a memset(foo, 0, ...) that overruns the buffer, so it's not
> controllable by the attacker
> 
> * but the denial of service scenario / attack vector is valid
> (consider network facing application using glibc's regexp matching
> on untrusted input)
> 
> Could you allocate a CVE id for this?
> 
> Thank you && Regards, Jan. -- Jan iankko Lieskovsky / Red Hat
> Security Response Team


Please use CVE-2013-0242 for this issue.

- -- 
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993

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