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Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2013 08:47:46 -0700
From: Vincent Danen <>
To: Sebastian Krahmer <>
Subject: Re: CVE Request coreutils

* [2013-01-22 08:25:23 +0100] Sebastian Krahmer wrote:

>Generally, I see your point. However sometimes services running as
>root 'sort' or 'uniq' user input e.g. via grepping logfiles etc,
>so there is indeed a real chance to indirectly trigger a privilege
>escalation. The past shows that segfaults can be turned into a
>code exec often. Its a stack overflow after all.

Do you believe this would be the case with modern GCC/Glibc hardening
though?  Wouldn't this just be rendered a crash?

But even then, if we're talking about logfiles (which is a reasonable
case) you'd have to be allowing user-controlled input to your logs,
which would mean you'd have another problem.

I'm also assuming, based on the comments in the first bug, that you need
a really large line (not just an entire file, but one line).  How likely
is it that you would be grepping a log file with ~10MB of data on one

Perhaps root grepping/sorting/etc. a logfile is a valid use-case and
some user-supplied input could be stored in there (perhaps a crafted
apache url, etc. or maybe a local user running logger to inject a custom
log entry), but do these programs even allow for a ~10MB in length URL
or data?

(I've not looked, maybe they do?)

>On Mon, Jan 21, 2013 at 06:33:07PM -0700, Kurt Seifried wrote:
>> Hash: SHA1
>> On 01/21/2013 01:39 PM, Vincent Danen wrote:
>> > * [2013-01-21 19:17:49 +0100] Moritz Muehlenhoff wrote:
>> >
>> >>> Can someone assign a CVE id for a buffer overflow in
>> >>> coreutils? Its the same code snippet (coreutils-i18n.patch) and
>> >>> it affects sort, uniq and join:
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>>
>> >>
>> >> Could you send the faulty patch to the list so that distros can
>> >> validate that they don't include it themselves?
>> >
>> > Red Hat/Fedora do include this patch, so it's more than just SUSE
>> > that ships them.  However, when I was looking at them last week,
>> > this struck me as just a non-exploitable crash and unless I'm
>> > missing something, I think it would be quite the stretch to call it
>> > a security flaw.
>> Agreed, there is no significant impact of exploitation and there is no
>> real easy way to trick a victim into doing this (and even if you do,
>> so what? now if it was code exec we might be talking about something
>> interesting).
>> - --
>> Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
>> PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
>> Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux)
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>> =rw4/
>> -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
>~ perl
>~ $_='print"\$_=\47$_\47;eval"';eval
>~ - SuSE Security Team

Vincent Danen / Red Hat Security Response Team 

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