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Message-ID: <1360226839.52825502.1357227136530.JavaMail.root@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 3 Jan 2013 10:32:16 -0500 (EST)
From: Jan Lieskovsky <jlieskov@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: "Steven M. Christey" <coley@...us.mitre.org>,
        Jan Wielemaker <J.Wielemaker@...vu.nl>, Petr Pisar <ppisar@...hat.com>
Subject: CVE Request - SWI-Prolog / pl (X < 6.2.5): Multiple (stack-based)
 buffer overflows in patch canonisation code and when expanding file-names
 with long paths

Hello Kurt, Steve, vendors,

  SWI-Prolog upstream has released [2] 6.2.5 / 6.3.7 versions,
correcting the following two security flaws:

* Issue #1 (from [2]):
=======================
* FIXED: Possible buffer overrun in patch canonisation code.
Pushes pointers on an automatic array without checking for
overflow.  Can be used for DoS attacks. Will be extremely
hard to make it execute arbitrary code.

Relevant upstream patch:
[1] http://www.swi-prolog.org/git/pl.git/commitdiff/a9a6fc8a2a9cf3b9154b490a4b1ffaa8be4d723c

References:
[2] https://lists.iai.uni-bonn.de/pipermail/swi-prolog/2012/009428.html
[3] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=891577

* Issue #2 - from [2]:
======================
* SECURITY: Possible buffer overflows when expanding file-names with
long paths.  Affects expand_file_name/2.  Can lead to crashes
(DoS attacks) and possibly execution of arbitrary code if an attacker
can control the names of the files searched for, e.g., if
expand_file_name/2 is used in a directory to which an attacker can
upload files for which he can control the name.

Relevant upstream patch:
[4] http://www.swi-prolog.org/git/pl.git/commitdiff/b2c88972e7515ada025e97e7d3ce3e34f81cf33e

References:
[5] https://lists.iai.uni-bonn.de/pipermail/swi-prolog/2012/009428.html
[6] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=891577

Could you allocate CVE ids for these? (iilc two should be
enough)

Thank you && Regards, Jan.
--
Jan iankko Lieskovsky / Red Hat Security Response Team

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