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Message-ID: <50DFBAC6.3090506@redhat.com> Date: Sat, 29 Dec 2012 20:53:42 -0700 From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com CC: David Holland <dholland-oss-security@...bsd.org>, Steven Christey <coley@...re.org> Subject: Re: Isearch insecure temporary files -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 12/21/2012 12:50 PM, David Holland wrote: > Looking at that thread (which I didn't see at the time because I > no longer have time to follow this list much) I think I'd agree > that the CVE system itself is the wrong scheme, not only for its > own reasons but also because it doesn't reach the right targets. > All of these problems also apply to any new scheme someone sets > up; what I'm suggesting is that the existing CVE infrastructure is > not necessarily that much of an advantage. One random thought, might it be worth adding structured data to CVE that basically says when the issue was made public/reported to the upstream and when upstream 1) acknowledged it (if ever) and then they patched it (if ever) and when they shipped a fixed version (if ever). Obviously then you could simply parse for the time between date reported and date acknowledged/patched/fixed and see how healthy/responsive the upstream is. - -- Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT) PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.12 (GNU/Linux) iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJQ37rFAAoJEBYNRVNeJnmTCSgQAIB9gSFe08KOfIVY+oUzRuQw ol9jgO8wfB3zKPca1EqSabi7pXVdebTZ+MhjIwC5I7kUxNS+ME1xLU2wcnwx2nMS SILB5ZltCv+JfXdf0VuAns047P/iaK4JAMuqFrXu3Bymjui4cSr+ypN5Ao7hXygu 09nFJ9hnZIoNIMqe8xy3xCFGXFEI9EN2zOE6bJf5uxIBAA2WSmMut9trZLYHo2wZ /NAuXWZOATe/tbt24YsJSZrL9HQZTmZL756UTK5/LEn4hQtpzPVv5NpHx2KWsMGf I2GZI1QYXnVaArH+HL4ZY9antd3KEahZLsKONq7ZGefpBZBqwyVVLwe/2fD5AVXV kLkb6svEeonwQevIYdj59pmIUuvKF0ooWdWasNnIqKWFh7en3yyuiy1ewKayGyTn 5AMdxKsx4byYGQDQsBgJERZCTRol17XiUwetuNPRWOW3gDCPMmdLeokgWp2esxaf INZXlKkcfgJvU69ke1fdaPfUo5abw52+3iYABzbTMzDXdNl1MezT6Pz78GNRyPPh xbpxEg5oqMttw+19AoC8yO7JIPdggGsMqhPDLD345moihXXh8FIidB5NFziSBT0z /sG4GjTPxOwzCs9hHnlxjtcw2SBYnil8SqGyA4LsesbL2+FGp4y3+iaM0p3ydVjU bjhIXvSv8FOZnDgoXp61 =DTEx -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
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