[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Date: Wed, 05 Dec 2012 09:37:59 +0100
From: Ludwig Nussel <ludwig.nussel@...e.de>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, kargig@...d.gr
Subject: Re: Linux kernel handling of IPv6 temporary addresses
Kurt Seifried wrote:
> [...]
> Sounds like this needs a CVE, is it correct that: an attacker can
> create a bunch of RA prefixes thus filling up the # of allowed IPv6
> addresses for an interface, preventing any more IPv6 addresses from
> being assigned to that interface? In other words an attack over the
> local network resulting in a DoS condition.
Well, an attacker that is allowed to send RA's could do all kinds of
ugly things, just like a rogue DHCP server could. Since that kind of
address configuration provides no means to verify authenticity, hosts
have no way to tell whether an RA is correct or malicious. Security
basically relies on the switches blocking unintended address
configuration.
cu
Ludwig
--
(o_ Ludwig Nussel
//\
V_/_ http://www.suse.de/
SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, GF: Jeff Hawn, Jennifer Guild, Felix Imendörffer, HRB 16746 (AG Nürnberg)
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Please check out the
Open Source Software Security Wiki, which is counterpart to this
mailing list.
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
