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Message-ID: <5076FB43.80800@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Oct 2012 11:00:51 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Vincent Danen <vdanen@...hat.com>
Subject: Re: CVE request: sSMTP doesn't validate server certificates
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Hash: SHA1
On 10/11/2012 09:43 AM, Vincent Danen wrote:
> * [2012-10-10 11:59:13 +0200] Laurent Bigonville wrote:
>
>> Hi,
>>
>> It seems that sSMTP is not checking the server certificate when
>> connecting. This is quite annoying as one of the main ssmtp
>> purpose is to be used on satellite systems that could be
>> connected to untrusted networks.
>>
>> This has been reported (with a proposed patch) to the Debian BTS
>> (see [0])
>>
>> Could you please allocate a CVE number for this?
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Laurent Bigonville
>>
>> [0] http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=662960
>
> I'm not sure it deserves one.
>
> If you look at the TLS file in the source tarball, it indicates
> that checking server certificates is not implemented and is
> something to add in the future:
>
> TODO: * Check server certificate for changes and notify about it. *
> Diffrent Certificate and Key file?
>
> Since sSMTP clearly indicates that this feature is missing and
> unsupported, then it was designed to _not_ do certificate
> checking. Regardless of how good or bad that is, it was a design
> choice (to leave it for a later date), and it's also clearly
> documented.
>
> To me, that doesn't seem like a security flaw (as in sSMTP was
> designed to check certificates and didn't or didn't do a good job
> of it).
Agreed, it's documented as a missing capability, so adding this counts
as security hardening, not a security fix. No CVE assigned.
- --
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
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