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Message-ID: <50164FD0.5080606@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Jul 2012 11:11:44 +0200
From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Ludwig Nussel <ludwig.nussel@...e.de>
Subject: Re: libdbus hardening
On 07/30/2012 10:59 AM, Ludwig Nussel wrote:
> Florian Weimer wrote:
>> On 07/17/2012 12:08 PM, Florian Weimer wrote:
>>
>>> Note that GNU libc will likely change the name to secure_getenv.
>>> Upstream does not want to document __secure_getenv as-is.
>>
>> This will be part of glibc 2.17. autoconf instructions are available here:
>>
>> <http://sourceware.org/glibc/wiki/Tips_and_Tricks/secure_getenv>
>
> Now the next step would be to make glibc automatically use secure_getenv
> when running setuid root and require programs to explicitly call
> insecure_getenv() or something like that :-)
You're welcome to absorb the transition costs. 8-) I looked into this
briefly, and the potentially insecure getenv calls are not in the
majority, so we'd have to expect quite a bit of breakage, or at least
add a configurable whitelist of variable names in a file in /etc.
FWIW, I consider PAM and NSS (Name Service Switch) the major problem
areas, too. Do you know if the APIs would allow confining plug-ins to
subprocesses? Then we only have to solve the transparent child process
problem.
--
Florian Weimer / Red Hat Product Security Team
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