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Message-ID: <20120710140703.GA9261@openwall.com>
Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2012 18:07:03 +0400
From: Solar Designer <solar@...nwall.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: libdbus hardening
On Tue, Jul 10, 2012 at 03:58:46PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
> On 07/10/2012 03:43 PM, Solar Designer wrote:
> >We already have __secure_getenv() in glibc, which I think is what
> >libraries like this should be using on systems with glibc.
>
> Sebastian's patches also include a check on prctl(PR_GET_DUMPABLE). I'm
> not sure if the libc approach (compare effective and real UIDs/GIDs on
> process start and base process environment trust decisions on that) is
> equivalent.
glibc also uses AT_SECURE.
PR_GET_DUMPABLE catches the extra case of a process that started e.g. as
root and has since switched creds, but do we actually want to restrict
processing of env vars in that case? Perhaps not, and so AT_SECURE is
more appropriate.
Alexander
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