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Message-ID: <87obolvjqg.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de>
Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2012 20:20:07 +0200
From: Florian Weimer <fw@...eb.enyo.de>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Xen Security Advisory 9 (CVE-2012-2934) - PV guest host DoS (AMD erratum #121)
* Xen org security team:
> There is no software fix for this issue. The workaround suggested by
> AMD in erratum #121 cannot be applied to Xen since the relevant address
> is under guest control.
>
> Applying the patch will cause Xen to detect vulnerable systems and
> refuse to boot.
This response puzzles me. Isn't this changing a potential denial of
service (a para-virtualized guest could attempt an exploit) to a
definite one (the system won't boot)? Why is this a good idea?
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