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Message-ID: <4FD62999.5090209@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2012 11:23:37 -0600
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: CVE request -- libvirt: address bus= device= when
identicle vendor ID/product IDs usb devices attached are ignored
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On 06/11/2012 10:29 AM, Petr Matousek wrote:
> Description of the problem: libvirt ignores address bus= device=
> when identicle vendor ID/product IDs usb devices attached with
> either virsh or virt-manager.
>
> As a consequence, wrong USB device can be assigned to the wrong
> guest.
>
> References and proposed upstream patch:
> https://www.redhat.com/archives/libvir-list/2012-April/msg01494.html
>
> Thanks,
Although there is no direct and simple way to trigger this behavior
(short of having physical access) a security boundary is crossed. An
example scenario: a cloud provider offers to attach a USB drive to the
VM so you can export the data to the HD which is then fedexed to the
customer overnight, or stored separately as a backup, etc. (lets face
it, 3tb delivered overnight is a lot faster than any internet link
I'll ever have).
The problem is that when USB devices are attached it's possible for
the specification of which VM the device is supposed to be attached to
to be ignored, resulting in it being attached to a different VM,
giving it direct access to the hardware.
Please use CVE-2012-2693 for this issue.
- --
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
PGP: 0x5E267993 A90B F995 7350 148F 66BF 7554 160D 4553 5E26 7993
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