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Message-ID: <4F505818.4030202@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 01 Mar 2012 22:18:16 -0700
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Marcus Meissner <meissner@...e.de>,
"Steven M. Christey" <coley@...us.mitre.org>
Subject: Re: Re: CVE Request (minor) -- osc: Improper sanitization
of terminal emulator escape sequences when displaying build log and build
status
On 02/28/2012 03:44 PM, Marcus Meissner wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 28, 2012 at 06:56:52PM +0100, Jan Lieskovsky wrote:
>> Hello Kurt, Steve, Marcus, vendors,
>>
>> a security flaw was found in the way osc, the Python language based
>> command
>> line client for the openSUSE build service, displayed build logs and build
>> status for particular build. A rogue repository server could use this flaw
>> to
>> modify window's title, or possibly execute arbitrary commands or overwrite
>> files via a specially-crafted build log or build status output containing an
>> escape sequence for a terminal emulator.
>>
>> References:
>> [1] https://bugzilla.novell.com/show_bug.cgi?id=749335
>> [2] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=798353
>>
>> I need to conclude, I don't know how OBS repositories work (if there is a
>> chance
>> of a rogue server being present). In any case, this issue is on the border
>> (pretty unlikely someone could alter content of OBS package during build --
>> in that case there would be more urgent issues than just particular terminal
>> window title change).
>>
>> But strictly taken, the trust boundary is crossed in the moment, someone
>> would schedule OBS build and wouldn't expect the build log / status can
>> perform terminal "side" effect yet.
>>
>> Marcus, please correct me if you don't agree this should get a CVE
>> identifier.
>>
>> If no one having objections and request appropriate, could you allocate one?
>
> I am not fully convinced it needs a CVE.
>
> It basically boils down to the old "logfile with content that might be controlled
> by an attacker pasted raw to a terminal" issue.
>
> There is some more control on the person who builds a specific package what is output
> thant there usually is in logfiles though.
>
> A rogue server is unlikely, however a malicious packager could echo "bad escape code"
> in his build and then ask for help on our IRC channels or mailinglists with package Y on project X.
> (anyone can create an account and build packages ... and asking for help is not uncommon)
> e.g. with "look at logfile with: 'osc buildlog home:user foopackage standard i586'.)
>
> Ciao, Marcus
Please use CVE-2012-1095 for this issue.
--
Kurt Seifried Red Hat Security Response Team (SRT)
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