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Message-ID: <4F1A1647.4050606@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Jan 2012 18:35:03 -0700
From: Kurt Seifried <kseifried@...hat.com>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
CC: Agostino Sarubbo <ago@...too.org>
Subject: Re: CVE request: spamdyke buffer overflow vulnerability

On 01/20/2012 01:42 AM, Agostino Sarubbo wrote:
> According to secunia advisory:
> https://secunia.com/advisories/47548/ :
> Description:
>
> Some vulnerabilities have been reported in spamdyke, which potentially can be 
> exploited by malicious people to compromise a vulnerable system.
>
> The vulnerabilities are caused due to boundary errors related to the incorrect 
> use of the "snprintf()" and "vsnprintf()" functions, which can be exploited to 
> cause buffer overflows.
>
> The vulnerabilities are reported in versions prior to 4.3.0.
>
>
> Solution
> Update to version 4.3.0.
>
>
> and from upstream changelog:
> http://www.spamdyke.org/documentation/Changelog.txt :
>
> Fixed a number of very serious errors in the usage of snprintf()/vsnprintf().
>     The return value was being used as the length of the string printed into
>     the buffer, but the return value really indicates the length of the string
>     that *could* be printed if the buffer were of infinite size. Because the
>     returned value could be larger than the buffer's size, this meant remotely
>     exploitable buffer overflows were possible, depending on spamdyke's
>     configuration.
>
> and from upstream mailing list:
> http://www.mail-archive.com/spamdyke-release@spamdyke.org/msg00014.html
>
> it also fixes a series of major bugs 
> that could lead to buffer overflows.  Depending on spamdyke's configuration, 
> these could cause remotely exploitable security holes.  Please upgrade 
> immediately!
>
> Please assign a CVE
>
Can you include some links to actual code commits? I want to prevent
duplicates and more information would aid in that.

-- 

--

-- Kurt Seifried / Red Hat Security Response Team

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