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Message-ID: <1317076730.3606.58.camel@guybrush>
Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2011 00:38:50 +0200
From: Johannes Schlüter <johannes@...lueters.de>
To: Vincent Danen <vdanen@...hat.com>
Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, Rasmus Lerdorf <rasmus@....net>, Zeev
Suraski <zeev@...d.com>, security@....net, Stas Malyshev
<smalyshev@...arcrm.com>
Subject: Re: Re: CVE request: is_a() function may allow
arbitrary code execution in PHP 5.3.7/5.3.8
On Mon, 2011-09-26 at 09:05 -0600, Vincent Danen wrote:
> * [2011-09-25 19:22:19 +0200] Pierre Joye wrote:
>
> >On Sun, Sep 25, 2011 at 6:38 PM, Rasmus Lerdorf <rasmus@....net> wrote:
> >> So
> >> are we talking about the tiny number of people who have explicitly
> >> enabled allow_url_include and are running the code with this bad autoloader?
> >
> >Yes, and that's why it is a very very minor problem. However it was
> >not happening before the code change. The few cases where the class
> >names&co have been sanitize before and the developer did not think
> >about cases like the one describe in the blog post. I think it is even
> >more rare combination, but it was not happening before our change.
>
> Thanks for all the discussion around this.
>
> Pierre has it right... prior to the change, whether it was intended or
> not, documented or not, PHP did things a certain way and users could
> (for better or worse) rely on a certain behaviour to do "the right
> thing" (right in the context of their application, even if it is wrong
> in the context of writing good PHP code). 5.3.7 changed that, which
> left applications that used this "feature" in a vulnerable state.
The old code didn't make code secure. There was still a high chance that
an attacker might exploit such a broken __autoload() function. If there
is an security issue it is the existence of allow_url_include.
> It's unfortunate for everyone that PHP gets so many CVEs assigned to it
> for trivial little things. I look at every CVE assigned for safemode
> or open_basedir bypass flaws... technically speaking, I would never
> consider those to be flaws because those functions are not meant to be
> sandboxing features or high security features, as outlined on PHP's
> page, however they do get CVEs assigned.
>
> Even though PHP does not consider those features to be security
> protection features, CVEs are still assigned. You would expect that
> most people would not rely on those features as security features, which
> means those "bypass" flaws should never really affect people in a
> security context, but the sad reality is that they do. CVE does not
> distinguish between good programming habits or bad ones. Flaws like
> this, that are only exposed due to bad programming in applications,
> still end up with CVEs assigned at the language level.
Well, I accept most of the safe_mode things. safe_mode is a way to also
limit "bad people" with local file access. Which is a different level.
(While nowadays virtualization etc. can be used to solve that need)
johannes
> I don't think those CVEs reflect poorly on PHP -- I think most people
> who know PHP, realize that people do dumb stuff and that a language like
> PHP makes it easier to do dumb stuff.
>
> In this case, I think this particular issue is more worthy of a CVE than
> the open_basedir/safemode-related CVEs (and there are _lots_ of those).
>
> ref: http://www.php.net/security-note.php
>
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