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Message-ID: <CAEZPtU7mj+gD_sb_4UKKqt2qdk9_pKZ8DhPcdoV-AxOHjvuQ8A@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 25 Sep 2011 19:22:19 +0200
From: Pierre Joye <pierre.php@...il.com>
To: Rasmus Lerdorf <rasmus@....net>
Cc: Zeev Suraski <zeev@...d.com>, Vincent Danen <vdanen@...hat.com>,
"oss-security@...ts.openwall.com" <oss-security@...ts.openwall.com>, "security@....net" <security@....net>,
Stas Malyshev <smalyshev@...arcrm.com>
Subject: Re: CVE request: is_a() function may allow arbitrary code execution
in PHP 5.3.7/5.3.8
On Sun, Sep 25, 2011 at 6:38 PM, Rasmus Lerdorf <rasmus@....net> wrote:
> So
> are we talking about the tiny number of people who have explicitly
> enabled allow_url_include and are running the code with this bad autoloader?
Yes, and that's why it is a very very minor problem. However it was
not happening before the code change. The few cases where the class
names&co have been sanitize before and the developer did not think
about cases like the one describe in the blog post. I think it is even
more rare combination, but it was not happening before our change.
--
Pierre
@pierrejoye | http://blog.thepimp.net | http://www.libgd.org
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