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Date: Tue, 12 Jul 2011 14:01:01 -0400 (EDT)
From: Josh Bressers <>
Cc: coley <>
Subject: Re: Apache symlink issue: can documented behavior be
 a security problem and hence get a CVE?

I'm going to leave this one for MITRE.



----- Original Message -----
> Hash: SHA1
> Hello List,
> Is it possible to assign a CVE for documented behavior? Communication
> with apache security showed, that following symlinks to arbitrary
> locations is a documented feature, even when "-FollowSymLink" option
> is
> in place. This allows any user with, that can modify some content
> served
> by apache to access any content accessible by the apache process, also
> content not visible to the user (e.g. outside the ftp-upload directory
> or forbidden like /proc/http-pid/maps). Due to the small window of
> opportunity, this might be relevant mostly when user can already
> execute
> code on the machine, so it is not a big issue. /proc/<pid>/mem is
> protected, when apache is running with setuid, so key material cannot
> be
> extracted using range headers. PUT was not tested so far.
> See also
> - --
> PGP: 156A AE98 B91F 0114 FE88 2BD8 C459 9386 feed a bee
> Version: GnuPG v1.4.6 (GNU/Linux)
> iD8DBQFOHC4exFmThv7tq+4RAooyAJ9Vh7F49em+AVT1HosEquCPS+olqQCfdVCO
> PDcCdoHHWTCHe53U+XTzefY=
> =fVzn

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