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Date: Wed, 29 Sep 2010 15:12:37 +0800
From: Eugene Teo <>
CC: Marcus Meissner <>,
        "Steven M. Christey" <>
Subject: Re: CVE request - kernel: prevent heap corruption
 in snd_ctl_new()

On 09/29/2010 03:01 PM, Marcus Meissner wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 29, 2010 at 02:49:52PM +0800, Eugene Teo wrote:
>> Reported by Dan Rosenberg. The snd_ctl_new() function in
>> sound/core/control.c allocates space for a snd_kcontrol struct by
>> performing arithmetic operations on a user-provided size without
>> checking for integer overflow.  If a user provides a large enough size,
>> an overflow will occur, the allocated chunk will be too small, and a
>> second user-influenced value will be written repeatedly past the bounds
>> of this chunk. This code is reachable by unprivileged users who have
>> permission to open a /dev/snd/controlC* device (on many distros, this is
>> group "audio") via the SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_ELEM_ADD and
>> Upstream commit:
> Doesnt seem to be valid. There is also no change in sounds/core/control.c
> since April in current mainline git.

Please use this link.;a=commitdiff;h=5591bf07225523600450edd9e6ad258bb877b779

main(i) { putchar(182623909 >> (i-1) * 5&31|!!(i<7)<<6) && main(++i); }

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