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Message-ID: <AANLkTik=KVOQQm5WMgY0PROt9hFBGr9V_1h1a9Csmw2-@mail.gmail.com> Date: Tue, 21 Sep 2010 00:25:33 -0400 From: Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@...il.com> To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com Subject: CVE request: kernel: Heap corruption in ROSE When binding a ROSE socket, the "srose_ndigis" field of the user-provided sockaddr_rose struct is intended to be restricted to less than ROSE_MAX_DIGIS. However, since this field is a signed integer, this check will pass when provided with a negative value, allowing the "source_ndigis" field of the rose_sock struct (which is an unsigned char) to be set to arbitrary values. Then, by calling a function such as rose_getname(), heap corruption results, since this field is used as a maximum index to read from and write into an array of ROSE_MAX_DIGIS size. This can only be triggered by unprivileged users when a ROSE device (e.g. rose0) exists. Reference (and fix): http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=128502238927086&w=2 -Dan
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