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Date: Tue, 21 Sep 2010 00:25:33 -0400
From: Dan Rosenberg <>
Subject: CVE request: kernel: Heap corruption in ROSE

When binding a ROSE socket, the "srose_ndigis" field of the
user-provided sockaddr_rose struct is intended to be restricted to
less than ROSE_MAX_DIGIS.  However, since this field is a signed
integer, this check will pass when provided with a negative value,
allowing the "source_ndigis" field of the rose_sock struct (which is
an unsigned char) to be set to arbitrary values.  Then, by calling a
function such as rose_getname(), heap corruption results, since this
field is used as a maximum index to read from and write into an array
of ROSE_MAX_DIGIS size.  This can only be triggered by unprivileged
users when a ROSE device (e.g. rose0) exists.

Reference (and fix):


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