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Date: Sat, 4 Sep 2010 14:37:25 +0100
From: Joe Orton <>
To: Jan Lieskovsky <>
Cc: "Steven M. Christey" <>,
        oss-security <>,
        Richard Moore <>,
        Simon Ward <>
Subject: Re: CVE Request 1, NSS 2, Qt: Doesn't handle
 wildcards in Common Name properly

On Fri, Sep 03, 2010 at 06:20:49PM +0200, Jan Lieskovsky wrote:
>   1, Network Security Services (NSS) handled wildcard (*) character
>      in the Common Name field of a x509v3 digital certificate.
>      If an attacker is able to get a carefully-crafted certificate,
>      signed by a Certificate Authority trusted by Firefox, the attacker
>      could use the certificate during the man-in-the-middle attack and
>      potentially confuse Firefox into accepting it by mistake. Different
>      vulnerability than CVE-2009-2408.

I would suspect that many of the usual raft of OpenSSL-based apps with 
hand-crafted cert identity checks will be vulnerable to this too, where 
wildcard certs are supported.

Regards, Joe

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