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Date: Thu, 2 Sep 2010 17:56:39 +0200
From: Tomas Hoger <>
Subject: Re: CVE id request: libc fortify source information

On Tue, 31 Aug 2010 16:02:14 -0400 (EDT) Steven M. Christey wrote:

> The risk may be very minimal, but the FORTIFY_SOURCE protection
> mechanism is not working "as advertised" - it can be manipulated for
> an admittedly-small information leak.

For the sake of correctness, protective technology that kicks in in the
Dan's example is stack protector, not FORTIFY_SOURCE.  Though it's
probably still glibc to blame for using the same error-reporting
function in both cases.

On Wed, 25 Aug 2010 21:49:20 +0200 Nico Golde wrote:

> As this also works for setuid programs it would be nice to get one
> assigned and have this patched.

It seems the fix would need to remove all possibly-useful info from the
error message.

Tomas Hoger / Red Hat Security Response Team

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