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Message-ID: <20090129100054.GA4095@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2009 10:00:54 +0000
From: Joe Orton <jorton@...hat.com>
To: Raphael Geissert <atomo64+debian@...il.com>
Cc: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: Re: CVE id request: php5
On Wed, Jan 28, 2009 at 02:00:42PM -0600, Raphael Geissert wrote:
> Josh Bressers wrote:
> [...]
> >
> > I may be missing something here, but this looks like an issue where a bad
> > script really needs to cause this. Wouldn't it be just as easy to for the
> > script author to delete the file in question via a PHP script?
> >
>
> No, please read carefully. If you have a script that doesn't do good
> input sanitation but takes a variable from the user's input and uses
> it as a key it will end up nuking the .ini file.
If the script is taking untrusted input data and passing it unsanitized
as the "key" argument to a dba_replace() call, it can override arbitrary
keys in the ini file anyway. Truncating the ini file to zero length
seems like a less severe problem than being able to write (arbitrary?)
data to arbitrary keys.
Regards, Joe
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