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Message-ID: <4fXAC5uj8WxiwyDGa4exYzy490I@DnrfhFPe1KmBT9SMnrHVxzpiU9A>
Date: Mon, 8 Dec 2008 17:19:52 +0300
From: Eygene Ryabinkin <rea-sec@...elabs.ru>
To: oss-security@...ts.openwall.com, jlieskov@...hat.com
Cc: coley@...re.org
Subject: Re: CVE Request (nagios)
Mon, Dec 08, 2008 at 03:57:46PM +0300, Eygene Ryabinkin wrote:
> Hmm, this seems to be unrelated to CVE-2008-5027, but it may be the
> upstream fix for CSRF: judging by the contents of
> http://git.op5.org/git/?p=nagios.git;a=commitdiff;h=9c2a418ab4f6e4ef3a53ddcde402fe4781caa764
> the original patch from Tim Starling should introduce at least 'csrf' word
> into cgi/cmd.c. And I am failing to find one in the latest version,
> http://nagios.cvs.sourceforge.net/viewvc/nagios/nagios/cgi/cmd.c?revision=1.47&view=markup
>
> So either it was fixed in the completely different way or it is the
> quick fix to prevent CSRFs for the eventhandler mangling commands.
Uhm, the fix for the CSRF was in the 3.0.5, but it was really simple
(and not very complete -- not every Nagios command was blocked ;):
----- cgi/cmd.c
static int cmd_submitf(int id, const char *fmt, ...)
{
char cmd[MAX_EXTERNAL_COMMAND_LENGTH];
const char *command;
int len, len2;
va_list ap;
command = extcmd_get_name(id);
/*
* We disallow sending 'CHANGE' commands from the cgi's
* until we do proper session handling to prevent cross-site
* request forgery
*/
if (!command || (strlen(command) > 6 && !memcmp("CHANGE", command, 6)))
return ERROR;
-----
So
http://nagios.cvs.sourceforge.net/viewvc/nagios/nagios/base/commands.c?r1=1.109&r2=1.110&view=patch
just completely closes the processing of these commands from the
Nagios side. May be this was the fix for the case when the evil
contents from the command file were still floating around but the
upgraded Nagios won't process them because they could go from the
previous successful attack but are lying unprocessed?
> It is a bit strange that it was done after 3.0.5 (CSRF was documented in
> 3.0.5 release notes), but... By the way, entry for CVE-2008-5028 speaks
> about 3.0.5 as about the vulnerable to the CSRF and it is inconsistent
> with the release notes at
> http://www.nagios.org/development/history/nagios-3x.php.
So I feel the the CSRF was "somehow closed" in 3.0.5 and CVE entry may
need fixing. The remains from this bug that could migrate from 3.0.5 to
3.0.6 (but not in the functional sense, only via the unprocessed command
file) were "fixed" in 3.0.6.
--
Eygene
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