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Message-ID: <CAMe9rOoo55aFHHuLf=zdc4PNvU+Tu9rtpWaMUdRL=JtHGbE3pA@mail.gmail.com> Date: Wed, 21 Feb 2024 13:12:47 -0800 From: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@...il.com> To: "Edgecombe, Rick P" <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com> Cc: "dalias@...c.org" <dalias@...c.org>, "linux-arch@...r.kernel.org" <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>, "suzuki.poulose@....com" <suzuki.poulose@....com>, "Szabolcs.Nagy@....com" <Szabolcs.Nagy@....com>, "musl@...ts.openwall.com" <musl@...ts.openwall.com>, "linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>, "linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org" <linux-riscv@...ts.infradead.org>, "kvmarm@...ts.linux.dev" <kvmarm@...ts.linux.dev>, "corbet@....net" <corbet@....net>, "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, "catalin.marinas@....com" <catalin.marinas@....com>, "broonie@...nel.org" <broonie@...nel.org>, "oliver.upton@...ux.dev" <oliver.upton@...ux.dev>, "palmer@...belt.com" <palmer@...belt.com>, "debug@...osinc.com" <debug@...osinc.com>, "aou@...s.berkeley.edu" <aou@...s.berkeley.edu>, "shuah@...nel.org" <shuah@...nel.org>, "arnd@...db.de" <arnd@...db.de>, "maz@...nel.org" <maz@...nel.org>, "oleg@...hat.com" <oleg@...hat.com>, "fweimer@...hat.com" <fweimer@...hat.com>, "keescook@...omium.org" <keescook@...omium.org>, "james.morse@....com" <james.morse@....com>, "ebiederm@...ssion.com" <ebiederm@...ssion.com>, "will@...nel.org" <will@...nel.org>, "brauner@...nel.org" <brauner@...nel.org>, "linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kselftest@...r.kernel.org>, "paul.walmsley@...ive.com" <paul.walmsley@...ive.com>, "ardb@...nel.org" <ardb@...nel.org>, "linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org" <linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org>, "linux-mm@...ck.org" <linux-mm@...ck.org>, "thiago.bauermann@...aro.org" <thiago.bauermann@...aro.org>, "akpm@...ux-foundation.org" <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, "sorear@...tmail.com" <sorear@...tmail.com>, "linux-doc@...r.kernel.org" <linux-doc@...r.kernel.org> Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH v8 00/38] arm64/gcs: Provide support for GCS in userspace On Wed, Feb 21, 2024 at 12:25 PM H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@...il.com> wrote: > > On Wed, Feb 21, 2024 at 12:18 PM H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@...il.com> wrote: > > > > On Wed, Feb 21, 2024 at 11:22 AM Edgecombe, Rick P > > <rick.p.edgecombe@...el.com> wrote: > > > > > > On Wed, 2024-02-21 at 14:06 -0500, dalias@...c.org wrote: > > > > Due to arbitrarily nestable signal frames, no, this does not suffice. > > > > An interrupted operation using the lock could be arbitrarily delayed, > > > > even never execute again, making any call to dlopen deadlock. > > > > > > Doh! Yep, it is not robust to this. The only thing that could be done > > > would be a timeout in dlopen(). Which would make the whole thing just > > > better than nothing. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > It's fine to turn RDSSP into an actual emulated read of the SSP, or > > > > at > > > > least an emulated load of zero so that uninitialized data is not left > > > > in the target register. > > > > > > We can't intercept RDSSP, but it becomes a NOP by default. (disclaimer > > > x86-only knowledge). > > > > > > > If doing the latter, code working with the > > > > shadow stack just needs to be prepared for the possibility that it > > > > could be async-disabled, and check the return value. > > > > > > > > I have not looked at all the instructions that become #UD but I > > > > suspect they all have reasonable trivial ways to implement a > > > > "disabled" version of them that userspace can act upon reasonably. > > > > > > This would have to be thought through functionally and performance > > > wise. I'm not opposed if can come up with a fully fleshed out plan. How > > > serious are you in pursuing musl support, if we had something like > > > this? > > > > > > HJ, any thoughts on whether glibc would use this as well? > > > > Assuming that we are talking about permissive mode, if kernel can > > suppress UD, we don't need to disable SHSTK. Glibc can enable > > ARCH_SHSTK_SUPPRESS_UD instead. > > Kernel must suppress all possible SHSTK UDs. If SHSTK is disabled by kernel, not by glibc, there can be 2 issues: 1. Glibc and kernel may be out of sync on SHSTK. 2. When kernel disables SHSTK, glibc may be in the middle of reading shadow stack in longjmp, searching for a restore token. > > > It is probably worth mentioning that from the security side (as Mark > > > mentioned there is always tension in the tradeoffs on these features), > > > permissive mode is seen by some as something that weakens security too > > > much. Apps could call dlopen() on a known unsupported DSO before doing > > > ROP. I don't know if you have any musl users with specific shadow stack > > > use cases to ask about this. > > > > > > > > -- > > H.J. > > > > -- > H.J. -- H.J.
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