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Message-ID: <20200122171508.GD30412@brightrain.aerifal.cx>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2020 12:15:08 -0500
From: Rich Felker <dalias@...c.org>
To: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>
Cc: 39236@...bugs.gnu.org, musl@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: coreutils cp mishandles error return from lchmod
On Wed, Jan 22, 2020 at 05:19:05PM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
> * Rich Felker:
>
> > On Wed, Jan 22, 2020 at 04:32:45PM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
> >> * Rich Felker:
> >>
> >> > On Wed, Jan 22, 2020 at 04:08:26PM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
> >> >> * Rich Felker:
> >> >>
> >> >> > On Wed, Jan 22, 2020 at 03:34:18PM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
> >> >> >> * Rich Felker:
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> > coreutils should be opting to use the system-provided lchmod, which is
> >> >> >> > safe, and correctly handling error returns (silently treating
> >> >> >> > EOPNOTSUPP as success) rather than as hard errors.
> >> >> >>
> >> >> >> glibc's lchmod always returns ENOSYS (except on Hurd). I don't know how
> >> >> >> lchmod is used in coreutils, but I suspect it is not particularly
> >> >> >> useful.
> >> >> >
> >> >> > When preserving permissions (cp -p, archive extraction, etc.), you
> >> >> > want lchmod to work correctly just for the purpose of *not* following
> >> >> > the link and thereby unwantedly changing the permissions of the link
> >> >> > target. But, fchmodat with AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW works just as well and
> >> >> > is standard, and that's really what coreutils should be using.
> >> >>
> >> >> I think you misread what I wrote: lchmod *always* returns ENOSYS. Even
> >> >> if the file is not a symbolic link. Likewise, fchmodat with
> >> >> AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW *always* returns ENOTSUP.
> >> >
> >> > Yes, I understood that. I was going into why there should be a real
> >> > implementation, but didn't make it clear that that was what I was
> >> > doing.
> >>
> >> Ah, yes, there should be a real implementation if we can get full
> >> lchmod/AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW behavior on file systems that support it. If
> >> we can't, I'm not sure if there is a point to it.
> >
> > The point is to fail when the target is a symlink, rather than
> > (erroneously and possibly dangerously) applying the chmod to the link
> > target. Actually supporting link modes is useless. It's the "not
> > modifying the target" that's important.
>
> The kernel supports it on some file systems, though:
>
> $ ls -l /tmp/x
> l---------. 1 fweimer fweimer 6 Jan 22 15:27 /tmp/x -> /tmp/x
>
> Although mode 0 curiously does not prevent readlink calls.
>
> > It's explained in the bz you just replied on,
> > https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=14578
> >
> > The point of the S_ISLNK check is to fail out early with the ENOTSUPP,
> > which the caller should treat as "success-like", in the non-racing
> > condition, without the need to open a fd (which may fail with
> > ENFILE/EMFILE) and without the need for /proc to be mounted.
> > Otherwise, a different error will be produced when one of those cases
> > is hit, and the caller will treat it as a real error.
>
> Hmm. The way I read the musl code, the O_PATH descriptor already
> exists. At this point, you can just chmod the O_PATH descriptor, and
> have the kernel report EOPNOTSUPP if the file system does not support
> that.
Oh, you mean the second one after it's already open? Maybe that's ok.
I was concerned it might follow the link and chmod the target at that
point. I thought you were asking about the ealier check before the
O_PATH open.
Rich
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