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Message-ID: <87v9p3ihvq.fsf@oldenburg2.str.redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2020 17:19:05 +0100
From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>
To: Rich Felker <dalias@...c.org>
Cc: 39236@...bugs.gnu.org, musl@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: Re: coreutils cp mishandles error return from lchmod
* Rich Felker:
> On Wed, Jan 22, 2020 at 04:32:45PM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
>> * Rich Felker:
>>
>> > On Wed, Jan 22, 2020 at 04:08:26PM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
>> >> * Rich Felker:
>> >>
>> >> > On Wed, Jan 22, 2020 at 03:34:18PM +0100, Florian Weimer wrote:
>> >> >> * Rich Felker:
>> >> >>
>> >> >> > coreutils should be opting to use the system-provided lchmod, which is
>> >> >> > safe, and correctly handling error returns (silently treating
>> >> >> > EOPNOTSUPP as success) rather than as hard errors.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> glibc's lchmod always returns ENOSYS (except on Hurd). I don't know how
>> >> >> lchmod is used in coreutils, but I suspect it is not particularly
>> >> >> useful.
>> >> >
>> >> > When preserving permissions (cp -p, archive extraction, etc.), you
>> >> > want lchmod to work correctly just for the purpose of *not* following
>> >> > the link and thereby unwantedly changing the permissions of the link
>> >> > target. But, fchmodat with AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW works just as well and
>> >> > is standard, and that's really what coreutils should be using.
>> >>
>> >> I think you misread what I wrote: lchmod *always* returns ENOSYS. Even
>> >> if the file is not a symbolic link. Likewise, fchmodat with
>> >> AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW *always* returns ENOTSUP.
>> >
>> > Yes, I understood that. I was going into why there should be a real
>> > implementation, but didn't make it clear that that was what I was
>> > doing.
>>
>> Ah, yes, there should be a real implementation if we can get full
>> lchmod/AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW behavior on file systems that support it. If
>> we can't, I'm not sure if there is a point to it.
>
> The point is to fail when the target is a symlink, rather than
> (erroneously and possibly dangerously) applying the chmod to the link
> target. Actually supporting link modes is useless. It's the "not
> modifying the target" that's important.
The kernel supports it on some file systems, though:
$ ls -l /tmp/x
l---------. 1 fweimer fweimer 6 Jan 22 15:27 /tmp/x -> /tmp/x
Although mode 0 curiously does not prevent readlink calls.
> It's explained in the bz you just replied on,
> https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=14578
>
> The point of the S_ISLNK check is to fail out early with the ENOTSUPP,
> which the caller should treat as "success-like", in the non-racing
> condition, without the need to open a fd (which may fail with
> ENFILE/EMFILE) and without the need for /proc to be mounted.
> Otherwise, a different error will be produced when one of those cases
> is hit, and the caller will treat it as a real error.
Hmm. The way I read the musl code, the O_PATH descriptor already
exists. At this point, you can just chmod the O_PATH descriptor, and
have the kernel report EOPNOTSUPP if the file system does not support
that.
Thanks,
Florian
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