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Message-ID: <4b9a1bb3-94f0-72af-f8f6-27f1ca2b43a2@schaufler-ca.com> Date: Wed, 10 Mar 2021 09:22:16 -0800 From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> To: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Serge Hallyn <serge@...lyn.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>, Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@....de>, David Howells <dhowells@...hat.com>, Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>, Eric Biederman <ebiederm@...ssion.com>, John Johansen <john.johansen@...onical.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@...data.co.jp>, Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 0/1] Unprivileged chroot On 3/10/2021 8:09 AM, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > Hi, > > The chroot system call is currently limited to be used by processes with > the CAP_SYS_CHROOT capability. This protects against malicious > procesess willing to trick SUID-like binaries. The following patch > allows unprivileged users to safely use chroot(2). Mount namespaces have pretty well obsoleted chroot(). CAP_SYS_CHROOT is one of the few fine grained capabilities. We're still finding edge cases (e.g. ptrace) where no_new_privs is imperfect. I doesn't seem that there is a compelling reason to remove the privilege requirement on chroot(). > > This patch is a follow-up of a previous one sent by Andy Lutomirski some > time ago: > https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/0e2f0f54e19bff53a3739ecfddb4ffa9a6dbde4d.1327858005.git.luto@amacapital.net/ > > This patch can be applied on top of v5.12-rc2 . I would really > appreciate constructive reviews. > > Regards, > > Mickaël Salaün (1): > fs: Allow no_new_privs tasks to call chroot(2) > > fs/open.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- > 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > > base-commit: a38fd8748464831584a19438cbb3082b5a2dab15
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