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Message-ID: <87mu31klld.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 14:51:10 -0500
From: ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>, Alexei
Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, Andrew
Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>, Christian Heimes
<christian@...hon.org>, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>, Deven
Bowers <deven.desai@...ux.microsoft.com>, Dmitry Vyukov
<dvyukov@...gle.com>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>, Eric Chiang
<ericchiang@...gle.com>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>, James
Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Jann Horn
<jannh@...gle.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Kees Cook
<keescook@...omium.org>, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
<nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>, Michael Kerrisk
<mtk.manpages@...il.com>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, Philippe
Trébuchet <philippe.trebuchet@....gouv.fr>, Scott Shell
<scottsh@...rosoft.com>, Sean Christopherson
<sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Steve
Dower <steve.dower@...hon.org>, Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>, Tetsuo
Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>, Thibaut Sautereau
<thibaut.sautereau@...p-os.org>, Vincent Strubel
<vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@....gouv.fr>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 4/7] fs: Introduce O_MAYEXEC flag for openat2(2)
Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> writes:
> When the O_MAYEXEC flag is passed, openat2(2) may be subject to
> additional restrictions depending on a security policy managed by the
> kernel through a sysctl or implemented by an LSM thanks to the
> inode_permission hook. This new flag is ignored by open(2) and
> openat(2) because of their unspecified flags handling. When used with
> openat2(2), the default behavior is only to forbid to open a directory.
>
> The underlying idea is to be able to restrict scripts interpretation
> according to a policy defined by the system administrator. For this to
> be possible, script interpreters must use the O_MAYEXEC flag
> appropriately. To be fully effective, these interpreters also need to
> handle the other ways to execute code: command line parameters (e.g.,
> option -e for Perl), module loading (e.g., option -m for Python), stdin,
> file sourcing, environment variables, configuration files, etc.
> According to the threat model, it may be acceptable to allow some script
> interpreters (e.g. Bash) to interpret commands from stdin, may it be a
> TTY or a pipe, because it may not be enough to (directly) perform
> syscalls. Further documentation can be found in a following patch.
>
> Even without enforced security policy, userland interpreters can set it
> to enforce the system policy at their level, knowing that it will not
> break anything on running systems which do not care about this feature.
> However, on systems which want this feature enforced, there will be
> knowledgeable people (i.e. sysadmins who enforced O_MAYEXEC
> deliberately) to manage it. A simple security policy implementation,
> configured through a dedicated sysctl, is available in a following
> patch.
>
> O_MAYEXEC should not be confused with the O_EXEC flag which is intended
> for execute-only, which obviously doesn't work for scripts. However, a
> similar behavior could be implemented in userland with O_PATH:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1e2f6913-42f2-3578-28ed-567f6a4bdda1@digikod.net/
>
> The implementation of O_MAYEXEC almost duplicates what execve(2) and
> uselib(2) are already doing: setting MAY_OPENEXEC in acc_mode (which can
> then be checked as MAY_EXEC, if enforced).
You are allowing S_IFBLK, S_IFCHR, S_IFIFO, S_IFSOCK as targets for
O_MAYEXEC?
You are not requiring the opened script be executable?
You are not requring path_noexec? Despite the original patch that
inspired this was checking path_noexec?
I honestly think this patch is buggy. If you could reuse MAY_EXEC in
the kernel and mean what exec means when it says MAY_EXEC that would be
useful.
As it is this patch appears wrong and dangerously confusing as it implies
execness but does not implement execness.
If you were simply defining O_EXEC and reusing MAY_EXEC as it exists
or exists with cleanups in the kernel this would be a small change that
would seem to make reasonable sense. But as you are not reusing
anything from MAY_EXEC this code does not make any sense as I am reading
it.
Eric
> This is an updated subset of the patch initially written by Vincent
> Strubel for CLIP OS 4:
> https://github.com/clipos-archive/src_platform_clip-patches/blob/f5cb330d6b684752e403b4e41b39f7004d88e561/1901_open_mayexec.patch
> This patch has been used for more than 12 years with customized script
> interpreters. Some examples (with the original O_MAYEXEC) can be found
> here:
> https://github.com/clipos-archive/clipos4_portage-overlay/search?q=O_MAYEXEC
>
> Co-developed-by: Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>
> Signed-off-by: Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>
> Co-developed-by: Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@....gouv.fr>
> Signed-off-by: Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@....gouv.fr>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
> Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>
> Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
> Cc: Deven Bowers <deven.desai@...ux.microsoft.com>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> ---
>
> Changes since v6:
> * Do not set __FMODE_EXEC for now because of inconsistent behavior:
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202007160822.CCDB5478@keescook/
> * Returns EISDIR when opening a directory with O_MAYEXEC.
> * Removed Deven Bowers and Kees Cook Reviewed-by tags because of the
> current update.
>
> Changes since v5:
> * Update commit message.
>
> Changes since v3:
> * Switch back to O_MAYEXEC, but only handle it with openat2(2) which
> checks unknown flags (suggested by Aleksa Sarai). Cf.
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200430015429.wuob7m5ofdewubui@yavin.dot.cyphar.com/
>
> Changes since v2:
> * Replace O_MAYEXEC with RESOLVE_MAYEXEC from openat2(2). This change
> enables to not break existing application using bogus O_* flags that
> may be ignored by current kernels by using a new dedicated flag, only
> usable through openat2(2) (suggested by Jeff Layton). Using this flag
> will results in an error if the running kernel does not support it.
> User space needs to manage this case, as with other RESOLVE_* flags.
> The best effort approach to security (for most common distros) will
> simply consists of ignoring such an error and retry without
> RESOLVE_MAYEXEC. However, a fully controlled system may which to
> error out if such an inconsistency is detected.
>
> Changes since v1:
> * Set __FMODE_EXEC when using O_MAYEXEC to make this information
> available through the new fanotify/FAN_OPEN_EXEC event (suggested by
> Jan Kara and Matthew Bobrowski):
> https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181213094658.GA996@lithium.mbobrowski.org/
> ---
> fs/fcntl.c | 2 +-
> fs/namei.c | 4 ++--
> fs/open.c | 6 ++++++
> include/linux/fcntl.h | 2 +-
> include/linux/fs.h | 2 ++
> include/uapi/asm-generic/fcntl.h | 7 +++++++
> 6 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/fcntl.c b/fs/fcntl.c
> index 2e4c0fa2074b..0357ad667563 100644
> --- a/fs/fcntl.c
> +++ b/fs/fcntl.c
> @@ -1033,7 +1033,7 @@ static int __init fcntl_init(void)
> * Exceptions: O_NONBLOCK is a two bit define on parisc; O_NDELAY
> * is defined as O_NONBLOCK on some platforms and not on others.
> */
> - BUILD_BUG_ON(21 - 1 /* for O_RDONLY being 0 */ !=
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(22 - 1 /* for O_RDONLY being 0 */ !=
> HWEIGHT32(
> (VALID_OPEN_FLAGS & ~(O_NONBLOCK | O_NDELAY)) |
> __FMODE_EXEC | __FMODE_NONOTIFY));
> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> index ddc9b25540fe..3f074ec77390 100644
> --- a/fs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/namei.c
> @@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ static int sb_permission(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *inode, int mask)
> /**
> * inode_permission - Check for access rights to a given inode
> * @inode: Inode to check permission on
> - * @mask: Right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC)
> + * @mask: Right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC, %MAY_OPENEXEC)
> *
> * Check for read/write/execute permissions on an inode. We use fs[ug]id for
> * this, letting us set arbitrary permissions for filesystem access without
> @@ -2849,7 +2849,7 @@ static int may_open(const struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag)
> case S_IFLNK:
> return -ELOOP;
> case S_IFDIR:
> - if (acc_mode & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC))
> + if (acc_mode & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC | MAY_OPENEXEC))
> return -EISDIR;
> break;
> case S_IFBLK:
> diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
> index 623b7506a6db..21c2c1020574 100644
> --- a/fs/open.c
> +++ b/fs/open.c
> @@ -987,6 +987,8 @@ inline struct open_how build_open_how(int flags, umode_t mode)
> .mode = mode & S_IALLUGO,
> };
>
> + /* O_MAYEXEC is ignored by syscalls relying on build_open_how(). */
> + how.flags &= ~O_MAYEXEC;
> /* O_PATH beats everything else. */
> if (how.flags & O_PATH)
> how.flags &= O_PATH_FLAGS;
> @@ -1054,6 +1056,10 @@ inline int build_open_flags(const struct open_how *how, struct open_flags *op)
> if (flags & __O_SYNC)
> flags |= O_DSYNC;
>
> + /* Checks execution permissions on open. */
> + if (flags & O_MAYEXEC)
> + acc_mode |= MAY_OPENEXEC;
> +
> op->open_flag = flags;
>
> /* O_TRUNC implies we need access checks for write permissions */
> diff --git a/include/linux/fcntl.h b/include/linux/fcntl.h
> index 7bcdcf4f6ab2..e188a360fa5f 100644
> --- a/include/linux/fcntl.h
> +++ b/include/linux/fcntl.h
> @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
> (O_RDONLY | O_WRONLY | O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_NOCTTY | O_TRUNC | \
> O_APPEND | O_NDELAY | O_NONBLOCK | O_NDELAY | __O_SYNC | O_DSYNC | \
> FASYNC | O_DIRECT | O_LARGEFILE | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | \
> - O_NOATIME | O_CLOEXEC | O_PATH | __O_TMPFILE)
> + O_NOATIME | O_CLOEXEC | O_PATH | __O_TMPFILE | O_MAYEXEC)
>
> /* List of all valid flags for the how->upgrade_mask argument: */
> #define VALID_UPGRADE_FLAGS \
> diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
> index f5abba86107d..56f835c9a87a 100644
> --- a/include/linux/fs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/fs.h
> @@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ typedef int (dio_iodone_t)(struct kiocb *iocb, loff_t offset,
> #define MAY_CHDIR 0x00000040
> /* called from RCU mode, don't block */
> #define MAY_NOT_BLOCK 0x00000080
> +/* the inode is opened with O_MAYEXEC */
> +#define MAY_OPENEXEC 0x00000100
>
> /*
> * flags in file.f_mode. Note that FMODE_READ and FMODE_WRITE must correspond
> diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/fcntl.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/fcntl.h
> index 9dc0bf0c5a6e..bca90620119f 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/fcntl.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/fcntl.h
> @@ -97,6 +97,13 @@
> #define O_NDELAY O_NONBLOCK
> #endif
>
> +/*
> + * Code execution from file is intended, checks such permission. A simple
> + * policy can be enforced system-wide as explained in
> + * Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/fs.rst .
> + */
> +#define O_MAYEXEC 040000000
> +
> #define F_DUPFD 0 /* dup */
> #define F_GETFD 1 /* get close_on_exec */
> #define F_SETFD 2 /* set/clear close_on_exec */
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