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Message-ID: <87a6z1m0u1.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org>
Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2020 14:36:38 -0500
From: ebiederm@...ssion.com (Eric W. Biederman)
To: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
Cc: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,  Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,  Alexei
 Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,  Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,  Andrew
 Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,  Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
  Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,  Christian Heimes
 <christian@...hon.org>,  Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,  Deven
 Bowers <deven.desai@...ux.microsoft.com>,  Dmitry Vyukov
 <dvyukov@...gle.com>,  Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,  Eric Chiang
 <ericchiang@...gle.com>,  Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>,  James
 Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,  Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>,  Jann Horn
 <jannh@...gle.com>,  Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>,  Kees Cook
 <keescook@...omium.org>,  Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
 <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>,  Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>,
  Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,  Michael Kerrisk
 <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,  Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,  Philippe
 Trébuchet <philippe.trebuchet@....gouv.fr>,  Scott Shell
 <scottsh@...rosoft.com>,  Sean Christopherson
 <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,  Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,  Steve
 Dower <steve.dower@...hon.org>,  Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>,  Tetsuo
 Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.SAKURA.ne.jp>,  Thibaut Sautereau
 <thibaut.sautereau@...p-os.org>,  Vincent Strubel
 <vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>,  kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
  linux-api@...r.kernel.org,  linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
  linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,  linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 3/7] exec: Move path_noexec() check earlier

Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net> writes:

> From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
>
> The path_noexec() check, like the regular file check, was happening too
> late, letting LSMs see impossible execve()s. Check it earlier as well
> in may_open() and collect the redundant fs/exec.c path_noexec() test
> under the same robustness comment as the S_ISREG() check.
>
> My notes on the call path, and related arguments, checks, etc:

A big question arises, that I think someone already asked.

Why perform this test in may_open directly instead of moving
it into inode_permission.  That way the code can be shared with
faccessat, and any other code path that wants it?

That would look to provide a more maintainable kernel.

Eric


> do_open_execat()
>     struct open_flags open_exec_flags = {
>         .open_flag = O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY | __FMODE_EXEC,
>         .acc_mode = MAY_EXEC,
>         ...
>     do_filp_open(dfd, filename, open_flags)
>         path_openat(nameidata, open_flags, flags)
>             file = alloc_empty_file(open_flags, current_cred());
>             do_open(nameidata, file, open_flags)
>                 may_open(path, acc_mode, open_flag)
>                     /* new location of MAY_EXEC vs path_noexec() test */
>                     inode_permission(inode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode)
>                         security_inode_permission(inode, acc_mode)
>                 vfs_open(path, file)
>                     do_dentry_open(file, path->dentry->d_inode, open)
>                         security_file_open(f)
>                         open()
>     /* old location of path_noexec() test */
>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200605160013.3954297-4-keescook@chromium.org
> ---
>  fs/exec.c  | 12 ++++--------
>  fs/namei.c |  4 ++++
>  2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
> index bdc6a6eb5dce..4eea20c27b01 100644
> --- a/fs/exec.c
> +++ b/fs/exec.c
> @@ -147,10 +147,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(uselib, const char __user *, library)
>  	 * and check again at the very end too.
>  	 */
>  	error = -EACCES;
> -	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode)))
> -		goto exit;
> -
> -	if (path_noexec(&file->f_path))
> +	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) ||
> +			 path_noexec(&file->f_path)))
>  		goto exit;
>  
>  	fsnotify_open(file);
> @@ -897,10 +895,8 @@ static struct file *do_open_execat(int fd, struct filename *name, int flags)
>  	 * and check again at the very end too.
>  	 */
>  	err = -EACCES;
> -	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode)))
> -		goto exit;
> -
> -	if (path_noexec(&file->f_path))
> +	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) ||
> +			 path_noexec(&file->f_path)))
>  		goto exit;
>  
>  	err = deny_write_access(file);
> diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
> index a559ad943970..ddc9b25540fe 100644
> --- a/fs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/namei.c
> @@ -2863,6 +2863,10 @@ static int may_open(const struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag)
>  			return -EACCES;
>  		flag &= ~O_TRUNC;
>  		break;
> +	case S_IFREG:
> +		if ((acc_mode & MAY_EXEC) && path_noexec(path))
> +			return -EACCES;
> +		break;
>  	}
>  
>  	error = inode_permission(inode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode);

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