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Message-ID: <87y2n55xzv.fsf@oldenburg2.str.redhat.com> Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2020 07:27:00 +0200 From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com> To: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org, Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>, Christian Heimes <christian@...hon.org>, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>, Deven Bowers <deven.desai@...ux.microsoft.com>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>, Eric Chiang <ericchiang@...gle.com>, James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>, Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>, Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>, Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>, Philippe Trébuchet <philippe.trebuchet@....gouv.fr>, Scott Shell <scottsh@...rosoft.com>, Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>, Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Steve Dower <steve.dower@...hon.org>, Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>, Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>, Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@...p-os.org>, Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, linux-api@...r.kernel.org, linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org, linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org, Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@....gouv.fr> Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 4/7] fs: Introduce O_MAYEXEC flag for openat2(2) * Al Viro: > On Thu, Jul 23, 2020 at 07:12:24PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote: >> When the O_MAYEXEC flag is passed, openat2(2) may be subject to >> additional restrictions depending on a security policy managed by the >> kernel through a sysctl or implemented by an LSM thanks to the >> inode_permission hook. This new flag is ignored by open(2) and >> openat(2) because of their unspecified flags handling. When used with >> openat2(2), the default behavior is only to forbid to open a directory. > > Correct me if I'm wrong, but it looks like you are introducing a magical > flag that would mean "let the Linux S&M take an extra special whip > for this open()". > > Why is it done during open? If the caller is passing it deliberately, > why not have an explicit request to apply given torture device to an > already opened file? Why not sys_masochism(int fd, char *hurt_flavour), > for that matter? While I do not think this is appropriate language for a workplace, Al has a point: If the auditing event can be generated on an already-open descriptor, it would also cover scenarios like this one: perl < /path/to/script Where the process that opens the file does not (and cannot) know that it will be used for execution purposes. Thanks, Florian
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