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Message-ID: <87y2n55xzv.fsf@oldenburg2.str.redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Jul 2020 07:27:00 +0200
From: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>
To: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
  linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org,  Aleksa
 Sarai <cyphar@...har.com>,  Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>,  Andrew
 Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,  Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
  Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@...ntu.com>,  Christian Heimes
 <christian@...hon.org>,  Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>,  Deven
 Bowers <deven.desai@...ux.microsoft.com>,  Dmitry Vyukov
 <dvyukov@...gle.com>,  Eric Biggers <ebiggers@...nel.org>,  Eric Chiang
 <ericchiang@...gle.com>,  James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>,  Jan Kara
 <jack@...e.cz>,  Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>,  Jonathan Corbet
 <corbet@....net>,  Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,  Lakshmi
 Ramasubramanian <nramas@...ux.microsoft.com>,  Matthew Garrett
 <mjg59@...gle.com>,  Matthew Wilcox <willy@...radead.org>,  Michael
 Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,  Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
  Philippe Trébuchet <philippe.trebuchet@....gouv.fr>,
  Scott Shell
 <scottsh@...rosoft.com>,  Sean Christopherson
 <sean.j.christopherson@...el.com>,  Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>,  Steve
 Dower <steve.dower@...hon.org>,  Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>,  Tetsuo
 Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,  Thibaut Sautereau
 <thibaut.sautereau@...p-os.org>,  Vincent Strubel
 <vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>,  kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
  linux-api@...r.kernel.org,  linux-integrity@...r.kernel.org,
  linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org,  linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org,
  Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@....gouv.fr>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 4/7] fs: Introduce O_MAYEXEC flag for openat2(2)

* Al Viro:

> On Thu, Jul 23, 2020 at 07:12:24PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>> When the O_MAYEXEC flag is passed, openat2(2) may be subject to
>> additional restrictions depending on a security policy managed by the
>> kernel through a sysctl or implemented by an LSM thanks to the
>> inode_permission hook.  This new flag is ignored by open(2) and
>> openat(2) because of their unspecified flags handling.  When used with
>> openat2(2), the default behavior is only to forbid to open a directory.
>
> Correct me if I'm wrong, but it looks like you are introducing a magical
> flag that would mean "let the Linux S&M take an extra special whip
> for this open()".
>
> Why is it done during open?  If the caller is passing it deliberately,
> why not have an explicit request to apply given torture device to an
> already opened file?  Why not sys_masochism(int fd, char *hurt_flavour),
> for that matter?

While I do not think this is appropriate language for a workplace, Al
has a point: If the auditing event can be generated on an already-open
descriptor, it would also cover scenarios like this one:

  perl < /path/to/script

Where the process that opens the file does not (and cannot) know that it
will be used for execution purposes.

Thanks,
Florian

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