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Message-ID: <CALCETrVeZ0eufFXwfhtaG_j+AdvbzEWE0M3wjXMWVEO7pj+xkw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 4 Aug 2019 16:55:58 -0700
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
To: Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz>, Song Liu <songliubraving@...com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@...earbox.net>
Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>,
LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>,
James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@...gle.com>, Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@...il.com>,
Mickaël Salaün <mickael.salaun@....gouv.fr>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@...ux.ibm.com>,
Philippe Trébuchet <philippe.trebuchet@....gouv.fr>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@...nel.org>, Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@....gouv.fr>,
Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>,
Yves-Alexis Perez <yves-alexis.perez@....gouv.fr>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Linux API <linux-api@...r.kernel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
Linux FS Devel <linux-fsdevel@...r.kernel.org>, Steve Grubb <sgrubb@...hat.com>,
Matthew Bobrowski <mbobrowski@...browski.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v1 1/5] fs: Add support for an O_MAYEXEC flag on sys_open()
On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 6:43 AM Jan Kara <jack@...e.cz> wrote:
>
> On Wed 12-12-18 09:17:08, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> > When the O_MAYEXEC flag is passed, sys_open() may be subject to
> > additional restrictions depending on a security policy implemented by an
> > LSM through the inode_permission hook.
> >
> > The underlying idea is to be able to restrict scripts interpretation
> > according to a policy defined by the system administrator. For this to
> > be possible, script interpreters must use the O_MAYEXEC flag
> > appropriately. To be fully effective, these interpreters also need to
> > handle the other ways to execute code (for which the kernel can't help):
> > command line parameters (e.g., option -e for Perl), module loading
> > (e.g., option -m for Python), stdin, file sourcing, environment
> > variables, configuration files... According to the threat model, it may
> > be acceptable to allow some script interpreters (e.g. Bash) to interpret
> > commands from stdin, may it be a TTY or a pipe, because it may not be
> > enough to (directly) perform syscalls.
> >
> > A simple security policy implementation is available in a following
> > patch for Yama.
> >
> > This is an updated subset of the patch initially written by Vincent
> > Strubel for CLIP OS:
> > https://github.com/clipos-archive/src_platform_clip-patches/blob/f5cb330d6b684752e403b4e41b39f7004d88e561/1901_open_mayexec.patch
> > This patch has been used for more than 10 years with customized script
> > interpreters. Some examples can be found here:
> > https://github.com/clipos-archive/clipos4_portage-overlay/search?q=O_MAYEXEC
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>
> > Signed-off-by: Thibaut Sautereau <thibaut.sautereau@....gouv.fr>
> > Signed-off-by: Vincent Strubel <vincent.strubel@....gouv.fr>
> > Reviewed-by: Philippe Trébuchet <philippe.trebuchet@....gouv.fr>
> > Cc: Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>
> > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
> > Cc: Mickaël Salaün <mickael.salaun@....gouv.fr>
>
> ...
>
> > diff --git a/fs/open.c b/fs/open.c
> > index 0285ce7dbd51..75479b79a58f 100644
> > --- a/fs/open.c
> > +++ b/fs/open.c
> > @@ -974,6 +974,10 @@ static inline int build_open_flags(int flags, umode_t mode, struct open_flags *o
> > if (flags & O_APPEND)
> > acc_mode |= MAY_APPEND;
> >
> > + /* Check execution permissions on open. */
> > + if (flags & O_MAYEXEC)
> > + acc_mode |= MAY_OPENEXEC;
> > +
> > op->acc_mode = acc_mode;
> >
> > op->intent = flags & O_PATH ? 0 : LOOKUP_OPEN;
>
> I don't feel experienced enough in security to tell whether we want this
> functionality or not. But if we do this, shouldn't we also set FMODE_EXEC
> on the resulting struct file? That way also security_file_open() can be
> used to arbitrate such executable opens and in particular
> fanotify permission event FAN_OPEN_EXEC will get properly generated which I
> guess is desirable (support for it is sitting in my tree waiting for the
> merge window) - adding some audit people involved in FAN_OPEN_EXEC to
> CC. Just an idea...
>
I would really like to land this patch. I'm fiddling with making
bpffs handle permissions intelligently, and the lack of a way to say
"hey, I want to open this bpf program so that I can run it" is
annoying.
--Andy
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