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Message-ID: <2236FBA76BA1254E88B949DDB74E612BA4BBA73C@IRSMSX102.ger.corp.intel.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Feb 2019 06:39:04 +0000
From: "Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@...el.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>, "Perla,
Enrico" <enrico.perla@...el.com>
CC: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
"tglx@...utronix.de" <tglx@...utronix.de>, "mingo@...hat.com"
<mingo@...hat.com>, "bp@...en8.de" <bp@...en8.de>, "keescook@...omium.org"
<keescook@...omium.org>, "tytso@....edu" <tytso@....edu>
Subject: RE: [RFC PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon
system call
> On Sat, Feb 9, 2019 at 3:13 AM Reshetova, Elena
> <elena.reshetova@...el.com> wrote:
> >
> > > On Fri, Feb 08, 2019 at 01:20:09PM +0000, Reshetova, Elena wrote:
> > > > > On Fri, Feb 08, 2019 at 02:15:49PM +0200, Elena Reshetova wrote:
> > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Why can't we change the stack offset periodically from an interrupt or
> > > > > so, and then have every later entry use that.
> > > >
> > > > Hm... This sounds more complex conceptually - we cannot touch
> > > > stack when it is in use, so we have to periodically probe for a
> > > > good time (when process is in userspace I guess) to change it from an
> interrupt?
> > > > IMO trampoline stack provides such a good clean place for doing it and we
> > > > have stackleak there doing stack cleanup, so would make sense to keep
> > > > these features operating together.
> > >
> > > The idea was to just change a per-cpu (possible per-task if you ctxsw
> > > it) offset that is used on entry to offset the stack.
> > > So only entries after the change will have the updated offset, any
> > > in-progress syscalls will continue with their current offset and will be
> > > unaffected.
> >
> > Let me try to write this into simple steps to make sure I understand your
> > approach:
> >
> > - create a new per-stack value (and potentially its per-cpu "shadow") called
> stack_offset = 0
> > - periodically issue an interrupt, and inside it walk the process tree and
> > update stack_offset randomly for each process
> > - when a process makes a new syscall, it subtracts stack_offset value from
> top_of_stack()
> > and that becomes its new top_of_stack() for that system call.
> >
> > Smth like this?
>
> I'm proposing somthing that is conceptually different.
OK, looks like I fully misunderstand what you meant indeed.
The reason I didn’t reply to your earlier answer is that I started to look
into unwinder code & logic to get at least a slight clue on how things
can be done since I haven't looked in it almost at all before (I wasn't changing
anything with regards to it, so I didn't have to). So, I meant to come back
with a more rigid answer that just "let me study this first"...
You are,
> conceptually, changing the location of the stack. I'm suggesting that
> you leave the stack alone and, instead, randomize how you use the
> stack.
So, yes, instead of having:
allocated_stack_top
random_offset
actual_stack_top
pt_regs
...
and so on
We will have smth like:
allocated_stack_top = actual_stack_top
pt_regs
random_offset
...
So, conceptually we have the same amount of randomization with
both approaches, but it is applied very differently.
Security-wise I will have to think more if second approach has any negative
consequences, in addition to positive ones. As a paranoid security person,
you might want to merge both approaches and randomize both places (before and
after pt_regs) with different offsets, but I guess this would be out of question, right?
I am not that experienced with exploits , but we have been
talking now with Jann and Enrico on this, so I think it is the best they comment
directly here. I am just wondering if having pt_regs in a fixed place can
be an advantage for an attacker under any scenario...
In plain C, this would consist of adding roughly this snippet
> in do_syscall_64() and possibly other entry functions:
>
> if (randomize_stack()) {
> void *dummy = alloca(rdrand() & 0x7f8);
>
> /* Make sure the compiler doesn't optimize out the alloca. */
> asm volatile ("" :: "=rm" (dummy));
> }
>
> ... do the actual syscall work here.
>
> This has a few problems, namely that the generated code might be awful
> and that alloca is more or less banned in the kernel. I suppose
> alloca could be unbanned in the entry C code, but this could also be
> done fairly easily in the asm code. You'd just need to use a register
> to store whatever is needed to put RSP back in the exit code.
Yes, I was actually thinking now on doing it in assembly since I think
it would look smaller and more clearer in it. Just need to get details slowly
in place.
The
> obvious way would be to use RBP, but it's plausible that using a
> different callee-saved register would make the unwinder interactions
> easier to get right.
This is what I started looking into, bear with me please, all this stuff is new
for my eyes, so I am slow...
>
> With this approach, you don't modify any of the top_of_stack()
> functions or macros at all -- the top of stack isn't changed.
Yes, understood.
>
> >
> > I think it is close to what Andy has proposed
> > in his reply, but the main difference is that you propose to do this via an interrupt.
> > And the main reasoning for doing this via interrupt would be not to affect
> > syscall performance, right?
> >
> > The problem I see with interrupt approach is how often that should be done?
> > Because we don't want to end up with situation when we issue it too often, since
> > it is not going to be very light-weight operation (update all processes), and we
> > don't want it to be too rarely done that we end up with processes that execute
> many
> > syscalls with the same offset. So, we might have a situation when some processes
> > will execute a number of syscalls with same offset and some will change their
> offset
> > more than once without even making a single syscall.
>
> I bet that any attacker worth their salt could learn the offset by
> doing a couple of careful syscalls and looking for cache and/or TLB
> effects. This might make the whole exercise mostly useless. Isn't
> RDRAND supposed to be extremely fast, though?
>
> I usually benchmark like this:
>
> $ ./timing_test_64 10M sys_enosys
> 10000000 loops in 2.53484s = 253.48 nsec / loop
>
> using https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/luto/misc-tests.git/
Thank you for the pointer!
With everyone's suggestions I am now having much better set of tools to do
my next measurements.
Best Regards,
Elena.
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