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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jKctN4SQr4H-jPywEw4Te+ObVZSV0bUR5MLqu1ZrgNEBA@mail.gmail.com> Date: Fri, 8 Feb 2019 13:28:02 -0800 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com> Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon system call On Fri, Feb 8, 2019 at 4:16 AM Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com> wrote: > --- a/mm/usercopy.c > +++ b/mm/usercopy.c > @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ > static noinline int check_stack_object(const void *obj, unsigned long len) > { > const void * const stack = task_stack_page(current); > - const void * const stackend = stack + THREAD_SIZE; > + const void * const stackend = (void *)task_top_of_stack(current); > int ret; > > /* Object is not on the stack at all. */ It seems like having task_top_of_stack() would be a nice refactoring to have regardless of this feature (and splitting out would make this patch a bit easier to read too). -- Kees Cook
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