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Message-ID: <99FC4B6EFCEFD44486C35F4C281DC6732143F7A4@ORSMSX107.amr.corp.intel.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Aug 2018 15:31:22 +0000
From: "Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@...el.com>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>
CC: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, kernel list
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-security-module
<linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>, "selinux@...ho.nsa.gov"
<selinux@...ho.nsa.gov>, "Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@...el.com>, "Dock,
Deneen T" <deneen.t.dock@...el.com>, "kristen@...ux.intel.com"
<kristen@...ux.intel.com>, Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: RE: [PATCH RFC v2 3/5] LSM: Security module checking for
side-channel dangers
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jann Horn [mailto:jannh@...gle.com]
> Sent: Friday, August 17, 2018 4:53 PM
> To: Schaufler, Casey <casey.schaufler@...el.com>
> Cc: Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>; kernel list
> <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>; linux-security-module <linux-security-
> module@...r.kernel.org>; selinux@...ho.nsa.gov; Hansen, Dave
> <dave.hansen@...el.com>; Dock, Deneen T <deneen.t.dock@...el.com>;
> kristen@...ux.intel.com; Arjan van de Ven <arjan@...ux.intel.com>
> Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC v2 3/5] LSM: Security module checking for side-
> channel dangers
>
> On Sat, Aug 18, 2018 at 12:17 AM Casey Schaufler
> <casey.schaufler@...el.com> wrote:
> >
> > From: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@...alhost.localdomain>
> >
> > The sidechannel LSM checks for cases where a side-channel
> > attack may be dangerous based on security attributes of tasks.
> > This includes:
> > Effective UID of the tasks is different
> > Capablity sets are different
> > Tasks are in different namespaces
> > An option is also provided to assert that task are never
> > to be considered safe. This is high paranoia, and expensive
> > as well.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@...el.com>
> [...]
> > +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SIDECHANNEL_UIDS
> > +static int safe_by_uid(struct task_struct *p)
> > +{
> > + const struct cred *ccred = current_real_cred();
> > + const struct cred *pcred = get_task_cred(p);
> > +
> > + /*
> > + * Credential checks. Considered safe if:
> > + * UIDs are the same
> > + */
> > + if (ccred != pcred && ccred->euid.val != pcred->euid.val)
> > + return -EACCES;
> > + return 0;
> > +}
>
> This function looks bogus. get_task_cred() bumps the refcount on the
> returned cred struct pointer, but you don't drop it. You probably want
> to use something that doesn't fiddle with the refcount at all here to
> avoid cacheline bouncing - possibly a raw rcu_dereference_protected()
> if there are no better helpers.
>
> Same thing for the other get_task_cred() calls further down in the patch.
Thanks. Looks like I whacked out v2 a bit hastily.
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