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Message-ID: <24c5699b-d222-486b-6f16-7539e931c436@linux.com> Date: Thu, 24 May 2018 16:05:27 +0300 From: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com> To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>, Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>, Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Richard Sandiford <richard.sandiford@....com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>, "Dmitry V . Levin" <ldv@...linux.org>, Emese Revfy <re.emese@...il.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>, "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>, Josef Bacik <jbacik@...com>, Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>, Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@...il.com>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@...wei.com>, David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>, Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>, Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>, Vikas Shivappa <vikas.shivappa@...ux.intel.com>, Kyle Huey <me@...ehuey.com>, Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@...tuozzo.com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>, Boris Lukashev <blukashev@...pervictus.com>, Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>, x86@...nel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 2/6] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls On 18.05.2018 09:53, Ingo Molnar wrote: > * Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com> wrote: >> + if (on_thread_stack()) >> + boundary = current_stack_pointer; >> + else >> + boundary = current_top_of_stack(); >> + >> + BUG_ON(boundary - p >= THREAD_SIZE); > > Please make this: > > if ( WARN_ON_ONCE()) > return; > > ... or so, so that if this code is buggy we get actual useful user reports, not > just "my machine froze, help!"... I've just double-checked that BUG() in erase_kstack() works fine when it's called from the trampoline stack and thread stack. But this "WARN_ON_ONCE() + return" logic would introduce an undesirable effect: modifying 'lowest_stack' value would allow to silently skip stack erasing. Best regards, Alexander
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