|
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJExz263gs6MpU4-NKR0qLvj=POAahrtbnYGiRbPQNtuQ@mail.gmail.com> Date: Tue, 22 May 2018 14:19:14 -0700 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>, Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>, Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Richard Sandiford <richard.sandiford@....com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>, "Dmitry V . Levin" <ldv@...linux.org>, Emese Revfy <re.emese@...il.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>, "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>, Josef Bacik <jbacik@...com>, Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>, Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@...il.com>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@...wei.com>, David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>, Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>, Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>, Vikas Shivappa <vikas.shivappa@...ux.intel.com>, Kyle Huey <me@...ehuey.com>, Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@...tuozzo.com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com>, Boris Lukashev <blukashev@...pervictus.com>, Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@...gle.com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org> Subject: Re: [PATCH v12 2/6] x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls On Tue, May 22, 2018 at 2:00 PM, Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com> wrote: > Currently 'lowest_stack' is a part of 'thread_struct', which is a "CPU-specific > state of this task". But in fact 'lowest_stack' is not CPU-specific. If I move > it to 'task_struct', Laura will avoid redefining it in 'thread_struct' in > arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h. And that will also allow me to create a > stackleak_task_init() inline helper in stackleak.h. Okay, give it a go! :) -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use? Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia and check out these guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.