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Message-ID: <CAGXu5j+C3p_dHyG1cRJdWTaC9+Mjc7VTEtXygiywTXnx+XmFRw@mail.gmail.com> Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 08:52:06 -0700 From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> To: Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...nel.org>, P J P <pjp@...oraproject.org>, Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@...aro.org>, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@...db.de>, Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@...ux.intel.com>, Alexander Popov <alex.popov@...ux.com>, Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, PaX Team <pageexec@...email.hu>, Brad Spengler <spender@...ecurity.net>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>, Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@...en8.de>, Richard Sandiford <richard.sandiford@....com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@...llo.nl>, "Dmitry V . Levin" <ldv@...linux.org>, Emese Revfy <re.emese@...il.com>, Jonathan Corbet <corbet@....net>, Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>, "Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@...ux.intel.com>, Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@...gle.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>, Josef Bacik <jbacik@...com>, Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@...nel.org>, Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@...il.com>, Al Viro <viro@...iv.linux.org.uk>, "David S . Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, Ding Tianhong <dingtianhong@...wei.com>, David Woodhouse <dwmw@...zon.co.uk>, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@...hat.com>, Dominik Brodowski <linux@...inikbrodowski.net>, Juergen Gross <jgross@...e.com>, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>, Mathias Krause <minipli@...glemail.com>, Vikas Shivappa <vikas.shivappa@...ux.intel.com>, Kyle Huey <me@...ehuey.com>, Dmitry Safonov <dsafonov@...tuozzo.com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org> Subject: Re: Fully initialized stack usage (was Re: [PATCH RFC v9 4/7] x86/entry: Erase kernel stack in syscall_trace_enter()) On Wed, Mar 14, 2018 at 7:21 AM, Florian Weimer <fweimer@...hat.com> wrote: > On 03/12/2018 06:45 PM, Linus Torvalds wrote: >> >> On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 10:17 AM, Kees Cook<keescook@...omium.org> wrote: >>> >>> On Mon, Mar 12, 2018 at 10:09 AM, Linus Torvalds >>> <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org> wrote: >>>> >>>> struct xyz var = { }; >>>> >>>> I'm not sure what that will do with padding. >>> >>> AIUI, this does not guarantee padding initialization (yet another >>> "undefined behavior"). This is why we've had to sprinkle memset(&var, >>> 0, sizeof(var)) in places where a structure has padding and got >>> leaked. :( >>> >>> I assume this may be orthogonal to -finit-local-vars, and maybe we'll >>> need some -finit-padding or something. (Though, honestly, is there >>> anyone that wants to get_padding_ correct, but not variable >>> initialization?) > > >> We would definitely have wanted it over the years, yes. And >> conceptually it's a separate issue, so a separate flag makes sense. > > > What would be the model for the kernel? Write zero to the padding > initially, and on copying structs, make sure that you either copy the > padding from the source, or clear the target? > > Clearing the padding while copying might be somewhat expensive. I think the common expectation is that copying does a full copy from the source. Zeroing of padding should be guaranteed by the constructor only, IMO. -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
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