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kernel-hardening mailing list - 2018/02/27
- [PATCH bpf-next v8 06/11] bpf,landlock: Add a new map type: inode (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
- [PATCH bpf-next v8 03/11] bpf: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
- [PATCH bpf-next v8 07/11] landlock: Handle filesystem access control (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
- [PATCH bpf-next v8 02/11] fs,security: Add a new file access type: MAY_CHROOT (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
- [PATCH bpf-next v8 05/11] seccomp,landlock: Enforce Landlock programs per process hierarchy (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
- [PATCH bpf-next v8 01/11] fs,security: Add a security blob to nameidata (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
- [PATCH bpf-next v8 04/11] bpf,landlock: Define an eBPF program type for Landlock hooks (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
- [PATCH bpf-next v8 00/11] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
- [PATCH bpf-next v8 08/11] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
- [PATCH bpf-next v8 10/11] bpf,landlock: Add tests for Landlock (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
- [PATCH bpf-next v8 09/11] bpf: Add a Landlock sandbox example (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
- [PATCH bpf-next v8 11/11] landlock: Add user and kernel documentation for Landlock (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
- Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 01/11] fs,security: Add a security blob to
nameidata (Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>)
- Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 01/11] fs,security: Add a security blob to
nameidata (Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>)
- Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 05/11] seccomp,landlock: Enforce Landlock
programs per process hierarchy (Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>)
- Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 08/11] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 00/11] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 05/11] seccomp,landlock: Enforce Landlock
programs per process hierarchy (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- [PATCH 0/3] leaking_addresses: limit scan to PID==1 ("Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>)
- [PATCH 1/3] leaking_addresses: skip all /proc/PID except /proc/1 ("Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>)
- [PATCH 2/3] leaking_addresses: skip '/proc/1/syscall' ("Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>)
- [PATCH 3/3] leaking_addresses: remove version number ("Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>)
- Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 05/11] seccomp,landlock: Enforce Landlock
programs per process hierarchy (Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>)
- Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 08/11] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH 1/3] leaking_addresses: skip all /proc/PID except /proc/1 (Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>)
- Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 05/11] seccomp,landlock: Enforce Landlock
programs per process hierarchy (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 05/11] seccomp,landlock: Enforce Landlock
programs per process hierarchy (Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@...il.com>)
- Re: [PATCH 1/3] leaking_addresses: skip all /proc/PID except /proc/1 ("Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>)
- Re: [PATCH 1/3] leaking_addresses: skip all /proc/PID except /proc/1 (Alexander Kapshuk <alexander.kapshuk@...il.com>)
- Re: [PATCH 1/2] stackleak: Update for arm64 (Richard Sandiford <richard.sandiford@....com>)
- Re: [PATCH 2/2] gcc-plugins: stackleak: Update for gcc-8 (Richard Sandiford <richard.sandiford@....com>)
- [PATCH v4] Protected FIFOs and regular files (Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@...il.com>)
- [PATCH 0/1] Zero initialise kernel stack variables (P J P <ppandit@...hat.com>)
- [PATCH 1/1] Add an option to build kernel with -finit-local-vars (P J P <ppandit@...hat.com>)
- [RFC PATCH] Randomization of address chosen by mmap. (Ilya Smith <blackzert@...il.com>)
- Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 05/11] seccomp,landlock: Enforce Landlock
programs per process hierarchy (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 05/11] seccomp,landlock: Enforce Landlock
programs per process hierarchy (Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>)
- Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 05/11] seccomp,landlock: Enforce Landlock
programs per process hierarchy (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 05/11] seccomp,landlock: Enforce Landlock
programs per process hierarchy (Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>)
- Re: [PATCH 1/1] Add an option to build kernel with -finit-local-vars (Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>)
- Re: [PATCH 0/1] Zero initialise kernel stack variables (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- Re: [PATCH 1/1] Add an option to build kernel with -finit-local-vars (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v4] Protected FIFOs and regular files (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- Re: [PATCH v4] Protected FIFOs and regular files (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- Re: [RFC PATCH] Randomization of address chosen by mmap. (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
- Re: [PATCH 1/3] leaking_addresses: skip all /proc/PID except /proc/1 ("Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>)
- Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 05/11] seccomp,landlock: Enforce Landlock
programs per process hierarchy (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
- Re: [RFC PATCH] Randomization of address chosen by mmap. (lazytyped <lazytyped@...il.com>)
- Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 00/11] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged
sandboxing (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
- Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 08/11] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
- Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 08/11] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions (Mickaël Salaün <mic@...ikod.net>)
- Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 08/11] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 00/11] Landlock LSM: Toward unprivileged sandboxing (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...capital.net>)
- Re: [PATCH bpf-next v8 08/11] landlock: Add ptrace restrictions (Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>)
- Re: [PATCH 0/1] Zero initialise kernel stack variables (Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>)
- Re: [PATCH 0/1] Zero initialise kernel stack variables (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)
56 messages
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