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Message-ID: <CAPcyv4ihN6fy5-vBtfA0PuwXvCAj8-rMhtQmevh5sdYxbH3Yfw@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 6 Feb 2018 11:48:45 -0800
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
To: Luis Henriques <lhenriques@...e.com>
Cc: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-arch <linux-arch@...r.kernel.org>,
Kernel Hardening <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>, Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>,
Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read
under speculation
On Tue, Feb 6, 2018 at 11:29 AM, Luis Henriques <lhenriques@...e.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 18, 2018 at 04:02:21PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
>> The syscall table base is a user controlled function pointer in kernel
>> space. Like, 'get_user, use 'MASK_NOSPEC' to prevent any out of bounds
>> speculation. While retpoline prevents speculating into the user
>> controlled target it does not stop the pointer de-reference, the concern
>> is leaking memory relative to the syscall table base.
>
> This patch seems to cause a regression. An easy way to reproduce what
> I'm seeing is to run the samples/statx/test-statx. Here's what I see
> when I have this patchset applied:
>
> # ./test-statx /tmp
> statx(/tmp) = -1
> /tmp: Bad file descriptor
>
> Reverting this single patch seems to fix it.
Just to clarify, when you say "this patch" you mean:
2fbd7af5af86 x86/syscall: Sanitize syscall table de-references
under speculation
...not this early MASK_NOSPEC version of the patch, right?
>
> Cheers,
> --
> Luís
>
>>
>> Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>
>> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>
>> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>
>> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>
>> Cc: x86@...nel.org
>> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@...nel.org>
>> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 2 ++
>> arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h | 9 ++++++++-
>> 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
>> index 4f8e1d35a97c..2320017077d4 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
>> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
>> @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
>> #include <asm/asm.h>
>> #include <asm/smap.h>
>> #include <asm/pgtable_types.h>
>> +#include <asm/smap.h>
>> #include <asm/export.h>
>> #include <asm/frame.h>
>> #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
>> @@ -264,6 +265,7 @@ entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath:
>> cmpl $__NR_syscall_max, %eax
>> #endif
>> ja 1f /* return -ENOSYS (already in pt_regs->ax) */
>> + MASK_NOSPEC %r11 %rax /* sanitize syscall_nr wrt speculation */
>> movq %r10, %rcx
>>
>> /*
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h
>> index 2b4ad4c6a226..3b5b2cf58dc6 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h
>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h
>> @@ -35,7 +35,14 @@
>> * this directs the cpu to speculate with a NULL ptr rather than
>> * something targeting kernel memory.
>> *
>> - * assumes CF is set from a previous 'cmp TASK_addr_limit, %ptr'
>> + * In the syscall entry path it is possible to speculate past the
>> + * validation of the system call number. Use MASK_NOSPEC to sanitize the
>> + * syscall array index to zero (sys_read) rather than an arbitrary
>> + * target.
>> + *
>> + * assumes CF is set from a previous 'cmp' i.e.:
>> + * cmp TASK_addr_limit, %ptr
>> + * cmp __NR_syscall_max, %idx
>> */
>> .macro MASK_NOSPEC mask val
>> sbb \mask, \mask
>>
>>
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