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kernel-hardening mailing list - 2018/01/19

• [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
• [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
• [PATCH v4 01/10] Documentation: document array_ptr (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
• [PATCH v4 03/10] x86: implement array_ptr_mask() (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
• [PATCH v4 04/10] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
• [PATCH v4 05/10] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
• [PATCH v4 06/10] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
• [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
• [PATCH v4 08/10] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
• [PATCH v4 09/10] kvm, x86: fix spectre-v1 mitigation (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
• [PATCH v4 10/10] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
• Re: [RFC][PATCH] get rid of the use of set_fs() (by way of kernel_recvmsg()) in sunrpc (Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk>)
• Re: [PATCH v4 09/10] kvm, x86: fix spectre-v1 mitigation (Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>)
• Re: [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Jann Horn <jannh@...gle.com>)
• Re: [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
• Re: [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Adam Sampson <ats@...og.org>)
• Re: [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>)
• Re: [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>)
• Re: [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
• Re: [PATCH] fork: Allow stack to be wiped on fork (Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>)
• Re: [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references (Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com>)
• Re: [PATCH 0/3] exec: Pin stack limit during exec (Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>)

22 messages

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