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Message-ID: <20180113085635.GA11640@kroah.com> Date: Sat, 13 Jan 2018 09:56:35 +0100 From: Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com> Cc: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@...ux-ipv6.org>, Netdev <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@....inr.ac.ru>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net>, Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com>, Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 10/19] ipv4: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution On Fri, Jan 12, 2018 at 10:47:44AM -0800, Dan Williams wrote: > On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 11:59 PM, Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@...emloft.net> > >> Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@....inr.ac.ru> > >> Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@...ux-ipv6.org> > >> Cc: netdev@...r.kernel.org > >> Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@...el.com> > >> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com> > >> --- > >> net/ipv4/raw.c | 10 ++++++---- > >> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) > > > > Ugh, what is this, the 4th time I've said "I don't think this is an > > issue, so why are you changing this code." to this patch. To be > > followed by a "oh yeah, you are right, I'll drop it", only to see it > > show back up in the next time this patch series is sent out? > > > > Same for the other patches in this series that I have reviewed 4, maybe > > 5, times already. The "v2" is not very true here... > > The theme of the review feedback on v1 was 'don't put ifence in any > net/ code', and that was addressed. > > I honestly thought the new definition of array_ptr() changed the > calculus on this patch. Given the same pattern appears in the ipv6 > case, and I have yet to hear that we should drop the ipv6 patch, make > the code symmetric just for readability purposes. Otherwise we need a > comment saying why this is safe for ipv4, but maybe not safe for ipv6, > I think 'array_ptr' is effectively that comment. I.e. 'array_ptr()' is > designed to be low impact for instrumenting false positives. If that > new argument does not hold water I will definitely drop this patch. I also argued, again in an older review of this same patch series, that the ipv6 patch should be dropped as well for this same exact reason. I didn't think you wanted to hear me rant about the same thing on both patches :) greg k-h
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