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Message-ID: <CAPcyv4j++bw8dO1cbEZpf3u+wDGM89A7d06MTHtugHHJs8CJ5g@mail.gmail.com> Date: Fri, 12 Jan 2018 16:41:37 -0800 From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@...el.com> To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org> Cc: Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, linux-arch@...r.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@...nel.org>, Russell King <linux@...linux.org.uk>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@...hat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@...or.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@...utronix.de>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Alan Cox <alan@...ux.intel.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 06/19] asm-generic/barrier: mask speculative execution flows On Fri, Jan 12, 2018 at 1:12 AM, Peter Zijlstra <peterz@...radead.org> wrote: > On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 04:46:56PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote: >> diff --git a/include/linux/nospec.h b/include/linux/nospec.h >> new file mode 100644 >> index 000000000000..5c66fc30f919 >> --- /dev/null >> +++ b/include/linux/nospec.h >> @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ >> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 >> +// Copyright(c) 2018 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved. >> + >> +#ifndef __NOSPEC_H__ >> +#define __NOSPEC_H__ >> + >> +#include <linux/jump_label.h> >> +#include <asm/barrier.h> >> + >> +#ifndef array_ptr_mask >> +#define array_ptr_mask(idx, sz) \ >> +({ \ >> + unsigned long mask; \ >> + unsigned long _i = (idx); \ >> + unsigned long _s = (sz); \ >> + \ >> + mask = ~(long)(_i | (_s - 1 - _i)) >> (BITS_PER_LONG - 1); \ >> + mask; \ >> +}) >> +#endif >> + >> +/** >> + * __array_ptr - Generate a pointer to an array element, ensuring >> + * the pointer is bounded under speculation to NULL. >> + * >> + * @base: the base of the array >> + * @idx: the index of the element, must be less than LONG_MAX >> + * @sz: the number of elements in the array, must be less than LONG_MAX >> + * >> + * If @idx falls in the interval [0, @sz), returns the pointer to >> + * @arr[@idx], otherwise returns NULL. >> + */ >> +#define __array_ptr(base, idx, sz) \ >> +({ \ >> + union { typeof(*(base)) *_ptr; unsigned long _bit; } __u; \ >> + typeof(*(base)) *_arr = (base); \ >> + unsigned long _i = (idx); \ >> + unsigned long _mask = array_ptr_mask(_i, (sz)); \ >> + \ >> + __u._ptr = _arr + (_i & _mask); \ >> + __u._bit &= _mask; \ >> + __u._ptr; \ >> +}) >> + >> +#ifdef CONFIG_SPECTRE1_IFENCE >> +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(nospec_key); >> +#else >> +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(nospec_key); >> +#endif >> + >> +#ifdef ifence_array_ptr >> +/* >> + * The expectation is that no compiler or cpu will mishandle __array_ptr >> + * leading to problematic speculative execution. Bypass the ifence >> + * based implementation by default. >> + */ >> +#define array_ptr(base, idx, sz) \ >> +({ \ >> + typeof(*(base)) *__ret; \ >> + \ >> + if (static_branch_unlikely(&nospec_key)) \ >> + __ret = ifence_array_ptr(base, idx, sz); \ >> + else \ >> + __ret = __array_ptr(base, idx, sz); \ >> + __ret; \ >> +}) > > > So I think this wants: > > #ifndef HAVE_JUMP_LABEL > #error Compiler lacks asm-goto, can generate unsafe code > #endif > > Suppose the generic array_ptr_mask() is unsafe on some arch and they > only implement ifence_array_ptr() and they compile without asm-goto, > then the above reverts to a dynamic condition, which can be speculated. > If we then speculate into the 'bad' __array_ptr we're screwed. True. > >> +#else >> +#define array_ptr __array_ptr >> +#endif >> + >> +#endif /* __NOSPEC_H__ */ > > > In general I think I would write all this in a form like: > > #define __array_ptr(base, idx, sz) \ > ({ \ > union { typeof(*(base)) *_ptr; unsigned long _bit; } __u; \ > typeof(*(base)) *_arr = (base); \ > unsigned long _i = (idx); \ > unsigned long _mask = array_ptr_mask(_i, (sz)); \ > \ > __u._ptr = _arr + (_i & _mask); \ > __u._bit &= _mask; \ > __u._ptr; \ > }) > > #if defined(array_ptr_mask) && defined(ifence_array_ptr) > > #ifndef HAVE_JUMP_LABEL > #error Compiler lacks asm-goto, can generate unsafe code > #endif > > #define array_ptr(base, idx, sz) \ > ({ \ > typeof(*(base)) *__ret; \ > \ > if (static_branch_unlikely(&nospec_key)) \ > __ret = ifence_array_ptr(base, idx, sz); \ > else \ > __ret = __array_ptr(base, idx, sz); \ > __ret; \ > }) > > #elif defined(array_ptr_mask) > > #define array_ptr(base, idx, sz) __array_ptr(base, idx, sz) > > #elif defined(ifence_array_ptr) > > #define array_ptr(base, idx, sz) ifence_array_ptr(base, idx, sz) > > #else > > /* XXX we want a suitable warning here ? */ > > #define array_ptr(base, idx, sz) (idx < sz ? base + idx : NULL) > > #endif > > and stick the generic array_ptr_mask into asm-generic/nospec.h or > something. > > Then the static key stuff is limited to architectures that define _both_ > array_ptr_mask and ifence_array_ptr. This certainly needs a Kconfig "depends on JUMP_LABEL" to turn on the dynamic switching at all, and a HAVE_JUMP_LABEL compile time failure if the compiler lacks support. I don't think we need the checks on 'defined(array_ptr_mask) or that 'XXX' warning case, because default mask is assumed safe, and otherwise better than nothing.
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