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Message-ID: <CAMuHMdVuc5yUNXhShb_vaR6T=qNexXm38mqBALeWzTNyGdHe+Q@mail.gmail.com> Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2017 23:57:40 +0100 From: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@...ux-m68k.org> To: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc> Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@...c4.com>, "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@....edu>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ho.ws>, "Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@...el.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@...tonmail.ch>, Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>, Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>, Ian Campbell <ijc@...lion.org.uk>, Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, Will Deacon <wilal.deacon@....com>, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>, Chris Fries <cfries@...gle.com>, Dave Weinstein <olorin@...gle.com>, Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>, Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@...hat.com>, "linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Network Development <netdev@...r.kernel.org>, David Miller <davem@...emloft.net>, Stephen Rothwell <sfr@...b.auug.org.au>, Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@...tuozzo.com>, Alexander Potapenko <glider@...gle.com>, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@...gle.com>, Andrew Morton <akpm@...ux-foundation.org>, Sergei Shtylyov <sergei.shtylyov@...entembedded.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH V11 3/5] printk: hash addresses printed with %p Hi Tobin, On Tue, Dec 5, 2017 at 9:44 PM, Tobin C. Harding <me@...in.cc> wrote: > On Tue, Dec 05, 2017 at 09:20:57PM +0100, Geert Uytterhoeven wrote: >> On Wed, Nov 29, 2017 at 3:05 AM, Tobin C. Harding <me@...in.cc> wrote: >> > Currently there exist approximately 14 000 places in the kernel where >> > addresses are being printed using an unadorned %p. This potentially >> > leaks sensitive information regarding the Kernel layout in memory. Many >> > of these calls are stale, instead of fixing every call lets hash the >> > address by default before printing. This will of course break some >> > users, forcing code printing needed addresses to be updated. >> > >> > Code that _really_ needs the address will soon be able to use the new >> > printk specifier %px to print the address. >> >> > --- a/lib/vsprintf.c >> > +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c >> >> > +/* Maps a pointer to a 32 bit unique identifier. */ >> > +static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, struct printf_spec spec) >> > +{ >> > + unsigned long hashval; >> > + const int default_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr); >> > + >> > + if (unlikely(!have_filled_random_ptr_key)) { >> > + spec.field_width = default_width; >> > + /* string length must be less than default_width */ >> > + return string(buf, end, "(ptrval)", spec); >> > + } >> > + >> > +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT >> > + hashval = (unsigned long)siphash_1u64((u64)ptr, &ptr_key); >> > + /* >> > + * Mask off the first 32 bits, this makes explicit that we have >> > + * modified the address (and 32 bits is plenty for a unique ID). >> > + */ >> > + hashval = hashval & 0xffffffff; >> > +#else >> > + hashval = (unsigned long)siphash_1u32((u32)ptr, &ptr_key); >> > +#endif >> >> Would it make sense to keep the 3 lowest bits of the address? >> >> Currently printed pointers no longer have any correlation with the actual >> alignment in memory of the object, which is a typical cause of a class of bugs. > > We'd have to keep the lowest 4 since we are printing in hex, right? This > is easy enough to add. I wasn't the architect behind the hashing but I > can do up a patch and see if anyone who knows crypto objects. Lowest 3 is good enough for all natural types, up to long long. We may still receive complaints from people who care about seeing if a pointer is cacheline-aligned or not. Fixing that may need up to 7 bits, I'm afraid, which is a bit too much to give up. Gr{oetje,eeting}s, Geert -- Geert Uytterhoeven -- There's lots of Linux beyond ia32 -- geert@...ux-m68k.org In personal conversations with technical people, I call myself a hacker. But when I'm talking to journalists I just say "programmer" or something like that. -- Linus Torvalds
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