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Message-ID: <20171104002430.GN21978@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Date: Sat, 4 Nov 2017 00:24:30 +0000 From: Al Viro <viro@...IV.linux.org.uk> To: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org> Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] x86: Allow paranoid __{get,put}_user On Fri, Nov 03, 2017 at 05:14:05PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > > x86 turns out to be easier since the safe and unsafe paths are mostly > > disjoint so we don't have to worry about gcc optimizing out access_ok. > > I tweaked the Kconfig to someting a bit more generic. > > > > The size increase was ~8K in text with a config I tested. > > Specifically, this feature would have caught the waitid() bug in 4.13 > immediately. You mean, as soon as waitid() was given a kernel address. At which point you'd get a shiny way to generate a BUG(), and if something like that happened under a mutex - it's even more fun... > > +config PARANOID_UACCESS > > + bool "Use paranoid uaccess primitives" > > + depends on ARCH_HAS_PARANOID_UACCESS > > + help > > + Forces access_ok() checks in __get_user(), __put_user(), and other > > + low-level uaccess primitives which usually do not have checks. This > > + can limit the effect of missing access_ok() checks in higher-level > > + primitives, with a runtime performance overhead in some cases and a > > + small code size overhead. IMO that's the wrong way to go - what we need is to reduce the amount of __get_user()/__put_user(), rather than "instrumenting" them that way.
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