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Message-ID: <CAGXu5jJconGeCQbRX9XOpPo__dgDY5zdRtb5G6ce7Wih7SHyiQ@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Nov 2017 17:14:05 -0700
From: Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
To: Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>
Cc: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, LKML <linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@....com>, X86 ML <x86@...nel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] x86: Allow paranoid __{get,put}_user
On Fri, Nov 3, 2017 at 4:04 PM, Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com> wrote:
> __{get,put}_user calls are designed to be fast and have no checks,
> relying on the caller to have made the appropriate calls previously.
> It's very easy to forget a check though, leaving the kernel vulnerable
> to exploits. Add an option to do the checks and kill the kernel if it
> catches something bad.
>
> Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@...hat.com>
> ---
> This is the actual implemtation for __{get,put}_user on x86 based on
> Mark Rutland's work for arm66
> lkml.kernel.org/r/<20171026090942.7041-1-mark.rutland@....com>
>
> x86 turns out to be easier since the safe and unsafe paths are mostly
> disjoint so we don't have to worry about gcc optimizing out access_ok.
> I tweaked the Kconfig to someting a bit more generic.
>
> The size increase was ~8K in text with a config I tested.
Specifically, this feature would have caught the waitid() bug in 4.13
immediately.
> ---
> arch/x86/Kconfig | 3 +++
> arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 11 ++++++++++-
> security/Kconfig | 11 +++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index 2fdb23313dd5..10c6e150a91e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -261,6 +261,9 @@ config RWSEM_XCHGADD_ALGORITHM
> config GENERIC_CALIBRATE_DELAY
> def_bool y
>
> +config ARCH_HAS_PARANOID_UACCESS
> + def_bool y
> +
> config ARCH_HAS_CPU_RELAX
> def_bool y
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> index d23fb5844404..767febe1c720 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h
> @@ -132,6 +132,13 @@ extern int __get_user_bad(void);
> #define __inttype(x) \
> __typeof__(__builtin_choose_expr(sizeof(x) > sizeof(0UL), 0ULL, 0UL))
>
> +
> +#define verify_uaccess(dir, ptr) \
> +({ \
> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PARANOID_UACCESS)) \
> + BUG_ON(!access_ok(dir, (ptr), sizeof(*(ptr)))); \
> +})
> +
> /**
> * get_user: - Get a simple variable from user space.
> * @x: Variable to store result.
> @@ -278,6 +285,7 @@ do { \
> typeof(ptr) __pu_ptr = (ptr); \
> retval = 0; \
> __chk_user_ptr(__pu_ptr); \
> + verify_uaccess(VERIFY_WRITE, __pu_ptr); \
> switch (size) { \
> case 1: \
> __put_user_asm(x, __pu_ptr, retval, "b", "b", "iq", \
> @@ -293,7 +301,7 @@ do { \
> break; \
> case 8: \
> __put_user_asm_u64((__typeof__(*ptr))(x), __pu_ptr, \
> - retval, \ errret); \
> + retval, errret); \
> break; \
> default: \
> __put_user_bad(); \
Which tree is this against? I don't see the weird line break in my tree?
> @@ -359,6 +367,7 @@ do { \
> typeof(ptr) __gu_ptr = (ptr); \
> retval = 0; \
> __chk_user_ptr(__gu_ptr); \
> + verify_uaccess(VERIFY_READ, __gu_ptr); \
> switch (size) { \
> case 1: \
> __get_user_asm(x, __gu_ptr, retval, "b", "b", "=q", \
Does __put/get_user_size_ex() need additions too? (And does
put/get_user_ex() lack access_ok() checks as-is? Looks like the users
are have access_ok() checks, but that naming really shouldn't be
aliased to "put/get_user_ex" -- otherwise it gives the impression it's
doing access_ok() checks...)
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
> index e8e449444e65..0a9ec1a4e86b 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -205,6 +205,17 @@ config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
> If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
> specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
>
> +config PARANOID_UACCESS
> + bool "Use paranoid uaccess primitives"
> + depends on ARCH_HAS_PARANOID_UACCESS
> + help
> + Forces access_ok() checks in __get_user(), __put_user(), and other
> + low-level uaccess primitives which usually do not have checks. This
> + can limit the effect of missing access_ok() checks in higher-level
> + primitives, with a runtime performance overhead in some cases and a
> + small code size overhead.
> +
> +
> source security/selinux/Kconfig
> source security/smack/Kconfig
> source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
> --
> 2.13.5
>
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
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