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Message-ID: <1507694810.3552.45.camel@perches.com> Date: Tue, 10 Oct 2017 21:06:50 -0700 From: Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com> To: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com, kvm@...r.kernel.org, linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>, Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>, "Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@...el.com>, Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>, Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@...tonmail.ch>, Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>, Ian Campbell <ijc@...lion.org.uk>, Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>, Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>, Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>, Chris Fries <cfries@...gle.com>, Dave Weinstein <olorin@...gle.com>, Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>, Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH] printk: hash addresses printed with %p On Wed, 2017-10-11 at 14:48 +1100, Tobin C. Harding wrote: > Currently there are many places in the kernel where addresses are being > printed using an unadorned %p. Kernel pointers should be printed using > %pK allowing some control via the kptr_restrict sysctl. Exposing addresses > gives attackers sensitive information about the kernel layout in memory. [] > diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c [] > @@ -1591,6 +1591,35 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn, > return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec); > } > > +static long get_random_odd_long(void) > +{ > + long val = 0; > + > + while((val & 1) == 0) { > + val = get_random_long(); > + } > + > + return val; > +} Perhaps static long get_random_odd_long(void) { return get_random_long() | 1L; }
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