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Message-Id: <1507693696-3777-1-git-send-email-me@tobin.cc>
Date: Wed, 11 Oct 2017 14:48:16 +1100
From: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>
To: kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
kvm@...r.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: "Tobin C. Harding" <me@...in.cc>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@...ux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@...hat.com>,
Tycho Andersen <tycho@...ker.com>,
"Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@...el.com>,
Tejun Heo <tj@...nel.org>,
Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@...tonmail.ch>,
Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>,
Petr Mladek <pmladek@...e.com>,
Joe Perches <joe@...ches.com>,
Ian Campbell <ijc@...lion.org.uk>,
Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@...il.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@....com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@....com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@...dmis.org>,
Chris Fries <cfries@...gle.com>,
Dave Weinstein <olorin@...gle.com>,
Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>,
Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@...il.com>
Subject: [PATCH] printk: hash addresses printed with %p
Currently there are many places in the kernel where addresses are being
printed using an unadorned %p. Kernel pointers should be printed using
%pK allowing some control via the kptr_restrict sysctl. Exposing addresses
gives attackers sensitive information about the kernel layout in memory.
We can reduce the attack surface by hashing all addresses printed with
%p. This will of course break some users, forcing code printing needed
addresses to be updated.
For what it's worth, usage of unadorned %p can be broken down as follows
git grep '%p[^KFfSsBRrbMmIiEUVKNhdDgCGO]' | wc -l
arch: 2512
block: 20
crypto: 12
fs: 1221
include: 147
kernel: 109
lib: 77
mm: 120
net: 1516
security: 11
sound: 168
virt: 2
drivers: 8420
Add function ptr_to_id() to map an address to a unique identifier. This
mapping is created by calling ptr_obfuscate() to hash the address. The
hashing algorithm is carried out in two stages. First the address is
xor'd by a random value then we multiply the xor production by a second
random value.
Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@...in.cc>
---
This is version 2 of the series (of which I sent only the cover letter,
failing to send the actual patches)
[PATCH 0/3] add %pX specifier
Implementing changes as suggested by Linus (in response to the cover
letter). Patch 2 and 3 of the original series dropped.
include/linux/printk.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++
lib/vsprintf.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/printk.h b/include/linux/printk.h
index e10f27468322..60c3d018efcf 100644
--- a/include/linux/printk.h
+++ b/include/linux/printk.h
@@ -41,6 +41,23 @@ static inline const char *printk_skip_headers(const char *buffer)
return buffer;
}
+/*
+ * Obfuscates pointer (algorithm taken from kptr_obfuscate(). See kernel/kcmp.c)
+ * v is the pointer value, randval is some random value, oddval is some random
+ * odd value.
+ *
+ * The obfuscation is done in two steps. First we xor the kernel pointer with
+ * a random value, which puts pointer into a new position in a reordered space.
+ * Secondly we multiply the xor production with a large odd random number to
+ * permute its bits even more (the odd multiplier guarantees that the product
+ * is unique ever after the high bits are truncated, since any odd number is
+ * relative prime to 2^n).
+ */
+static inline long ptr_obfuscate(long v, long randval, long oddval)
+{
+ return (v ^ randval) * oddval;
+}
+
#define CONSOLE_EXT_LOG_MAX 8192
/* printk's without a loglevel use this.. */
diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index 86c3385b9eb3..399cc090be75 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -1591,6 +1591,35 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn,
return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec);
}
+static long get_random_odd_long(void)
+{
+ long val = 0;
+
+ while((val & 1) == 0) {
+ val = get_random_long();
+ }
+
+ return val;
+}
+
+/* Maps a pointer to a unique identifier. */
+static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, struct printf_spec spec)
+{
+ long hashval;
+ static long randval = 0;
+ static long oddval = 0;
+
+ if (oddval == 0 && randval == 0) {
+ randval = get_random_long();
+ oddval = get_random_odd_long();
+ }
+
+ hashval = ptr_obfuscate((unsigned long)ptr, randval, oddval);
+ spec.base = 16;
+
+ return number(buf, end, hashval, spec);
+}
+
int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
/*
@@ -1703,6 +1732,9 @@ int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
* Note: The difference between 'S' and 'F' is that on ia64 and ppc64
* function pointers are really function descriptors, which contain a
* pointer to the real address.
+ *
+ * Default behaviour (unadorned %p) is to hash the address, rendering it useful
+ * as a unique identifier.
*/
static noinline_for_stack
char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,
@@ -1858,14 +1890,13 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,
return device_node_string(buf, end, ptr, spec, fmt + 1);
}
}
- spec.flags |= SMALL;
if (spec.field_width == -1) {
spec.field_width = default_width;
spec.flags |= ZEROPAD;
}
spec.base = 16;
- return number(buf, end, (unsigned long) ptr, spec);
+ return ptr_to_id(buf, end, ptr, spec);
}
/*
--
2.7.4
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