[<prev] [next>] [<thread-prev] [thread-next>] [day] [month] [year] [list]
Message-ID: <1496187633.17013.2.camel@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 30 May 2017 19:40:33 -0400
From: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@...il.com>
To: Matt Brown <matt@...tt.com>, Nick Kralevich <nnk@...gle.com>, Stephen
Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>, Alan Cox <gnomes@...rguk.ukuu.org.uk>, Kees
Cook <keescook@...omium.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>, Boris Lukashev
<blukashev@...pervictus.com>, Greg KH <gregkh@...uxfoundation.org>, "Serge
E. Hallyn" <serge@...lyn.com>, kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>, linux-kernel
<linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make
TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN
On Tue, 2017-05-30 at 19:00 -0400, Matt Brown wrote:
> On 5/30/17 4:22 PM, Daniel Micay wrote:
> > > Thanks, I didn't know that android was doing this. I still think
> > > this
> > > feature
> > > is worthwhile for people to be able to harden their systems
> > > against
> > > this attack
> > > vector without having to implement a MAC.
> >
> > Since there's a capable LSM hook for ioctl already, it means it
> > could go
> > in Yama with ptrace_scope but core kernel code would still need to
> > be
> > changed to track the owning tty. I think Yama vs. core kernel
> > shouldn't
> > matter much anymore due to stackable LSMs.
> >
>
> What does everyone think about a v8 that moves this feature under Yama
> and uses
> the file_ioctl LSM hook?
It would only make a difference if it could be fully contained there, as
in not depending on tracking the tty owner.
Powered by blists - more mailing lists
Confused about mailing lists and their use?
Read about mailing lists on Wikipedia
and check out these
guidelines on proper formatting of your messages.
