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Message-ID: <20170524123446.78510066@annuminas.surriel.com>
Date: Wed, 24 May 2017 12:34:46 -0400
From: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>
To: linux-kernel@...r.kernel.org
Cc: danielmicay@...il.com, tytso@....edu, keescook@...omium.org,
hpa@...or.com, luto@...capital.net, mingo@...nel.org, x86@...nel.org,
linux-arm-kernel@...ts.infradead.org, catalin.marinas@....com,
linux-sh@...r.kernel.org, ysato@...rs.sourceforge.jp,
kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com
Subject: [PATCH 5/5] sh64: ascii armor the sh64 boot init stack canary
Use the ascii-armor canary to prevent unterminated C string overflows
from being able to successfully overwrite the canary, even if they
somehow obtain the canary value.
Inspired by execshield ascii-armor and Daniel Micay's linux-hardened tree.
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@...hat.com>
---
arch/sh/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/arch/sh/include/asm/stackprotector.h b/arch/sh/include/asm/stackprotector.h
index d9df3a76847c..141515a43b78 100644
--- a/arch/sh/include/asm/stackprotector.h
+++ b/arch/sh/include/asm/stackprotector.h
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void)
/* Try to get a semi random initial value. */
get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary));
canary ^= LINUX_VERSION_CODE;
+ canary &= CANARY_MASK;
current->stack_canary = canary;
__stack_chk_guard = current->stack_canary;
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