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Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.20.1702141346220.19475@namei.org>
Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2017 13:46:28 +1100 (AEDT)
From: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
        Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
        linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
        "kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
        Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Subject: Re: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/4] security: mark nf ops in
 SELinux and Smack as __ro_after_init

On Mon, 13 Feb 2017, Casey Schaufler wrote:

> On 2/13/2017 2:26 PM, James Morris wrote:
> > On Mon, 13 Feb 2017, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> >
> >> If we changed CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE to
> >> CONFIG_SECURITY_DYNAMIC_MODULES and put the __ro_after_init
> >> under !CONFIG_SECURITY_DYNAMIC_MODULES we solve both the
> >> current and potential future issues.
> > We don't need to solve issues which don't exist and ideally will not 
> > exist.
> >
> There is a problem with CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
> and __ro_after_init that does exist. Whether the possible
> future issue should or shouldn't exist has no bearing on
> the existing issue. It's true that we don't need to change
> CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE to CONFIG_SECURITY_DYNAMIC_MODULES
> to solve the current problem. I suggest that we leave that
> change to the separate debate on loadable security modules.

Agreed.


-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@...ei.org>

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