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Message-ID: <a4a8572c-938b-8fa8-82e5-01b4e1e752ce@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Feb 2017 17:58:41 -0800
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@...aufler-ca.com>
To: James Morris <jmorris@...ei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@...ho.nsa.gov>, Kees Cook <keescook@...omium.org>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@...ove.sakura.ne.jp>,
linux-security-module <linux-security-module@...r.kernel.org>,
"kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com" <kernel-hardening@...ts.openwall.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@...l-moore.com>
Subject: Re: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/4] security: mark nf ops in
SELinux and Smack as __ro_after_init
On 2/13/2017 2:26 PM, James Morris wrote:
> On Mon, 13 Feb 2017, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>
>> If we changed CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE to
>> CONFIG_SECURITY_DYNAMIC_MODULES and put the __ro_after_init
>> under !CONFIG_SECURITY_DYNAMIC_MODULES we solve both the
>> current and potential future issues.
> We don't need to solve issues which don't exist and ideally will not
> exist.
>
There is a problem with CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
and __ro_after_init that does exist. Whether the possible
future issue should or shouldn't exist has no bearing on
the existing issue. It's true that we don't need to change
CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE to CONFIG_SECURITY_DYNAMIC_MODULES
to solve the current problem. I suggest that we leave that
change to the separate debate on loadable security modules.
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